DuetsBlog

Collaborations in Creativity & the Law

We can Keep Googling the GOOGLE Mark: Supreme Court Denies Cert

Posted in Famous Marks, Genericide, Mixed Bag of Nuts, Search Engines, Trademarks

Many of us have been eagerly waiting to see whether the Supreme Court would consider Google’s potential genericness.

As Martha explained, the case began in 2012, after petitioners Chris Gillespie and David Elliot attempted to register hundreds of web domains that included the word “Google” together with a variety of different people, products, and brands (i.e., googlestarbucks.com).  Google objected to the registrations, and Elliot filed a complaint (joined by Gillespie) in federal district court.  Elliot and Gillespie argued that “google” had become a generic term due to its common use as a verb.  The district court ruled against Elliot and Gillespie on summary judgment.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s opinion.  As Tucker discussed recently, the Ninth Circuit held that “verb use does not automatically constitute generic use.”  The court clarified that the mere act of using the term as a verb does not render the mark generic unless it is used to refer to a type of good or service (i.e. an internet search generally).

Without comment, the Supreme Court denied Elliot’s and Gillespie’s petition for review.  (Notably, of the 7,000-8,000 petitions filed each year, the Supreme Court grants and hears argument in only about 80 of them.)

While Google is surely celebrating the Supreme Court’s refusal to hear the case, Band-Aid, Xerox, and Rollerblade are cheering right along with them, while cellophane, aspirin, and thermos look on with envy.

Forget Prince; Minnesota Opens Courts to Hulk Hogans of the World with Revenge Porn Civil Action

Posted in Copyrights, Law Suits, Mixed Bag of Nuts

Recently, I attended the University of Minnesota’s celebration of “40 Years of Gopher Justice,” an event honoring the institution’s University Student Legal Service (“USLS”), a non-profit organization that provides UMN students with free legal services. The celebration included a panel on a contemporary topic in student advocacy: “revenge porn.” The topic isn’t relevant just for students, though. One may recall that just last year Hulk Hogan successfully sued the now-defunct gossip news site Gawker for its dissemination of a sex tape depicting him and another woman. Hulk Hogan eventually settled the case with Gawker for $31M.

Hulk Hogan testifies in his suit against Gawker. Image credit: Slate.

The USLS celebration panel hosted three experts on revenge porn, including two attorneys knowledgeable about Minnesota’s new suite of civil and criminal remedies that went into effect in late-summer 2016. See Minn. Stat. §§ 604.31 (civil), 617.261 (criminal). In response to my question about the civil action, one of the attorneys remarked that he believed the Minnesota law created a “copyright” to one’s image, enabling that person to prevent unwanted dissemination and exploitation of pictures and recordings depicting the person in a sexual way. For the sake of persons hoping to prevent and recover damages for unwanted dissemination under Minnesota’s new law, I hope he’s incorrect; after all, the Copyright Act preempts all state laws that overlap with federal protections over the subject matter of copyright, see 17 U.S.C. § 301(a)—which includes photographs and videos, see 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5)-(6).

In order to bring a civil action for non-consensual dissemination of private images (the “revenge porn civil action”) in Minnesota, (1) the defendant must have disseminated a private image without the plaintiff’s consent, (2) the image must have been of a sexual character, (3) the plaintiff must have been identifiable in the image, and (4) the image must have been obtained or created under circumstances in which the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy. See § 604.31, subd. 1. If these four elements are shown, the plaintiff may recover general and special damages, including financial losses resulting from the dissemination of an image and damages for mental anguish, disgorgement of profits made from dissemination, civil penalties, and attorneys’ fees. See § 604.31, subd. 3. See the Minnesota Senate’s overview of this law for more general information about the revenge porn civil action.

What’s interesting about this cause of action is that it’s a blend of both (1) the right to privacy and (2) an intellectual property right called the right of publicity. Right to privacy claims (for invasion of privacy) typically remedy the unjustified exploitation of one’s personality and injury to privacy interests that are emotive or reputational. Right of publicity claims, on the other hand, combat the unauthorized use of one’s identity in commercial advertising and compensate persons for the value of the commercial use of that identity and/or reductions in the value of the cultivated identity. Minnesota’s revenge porn civil action appears to be a specific hybrid of both kinds of claims; it protects both privacy and property interests in a person’s identity and provides relief in the form of both reputational and economic damages, as well as injunctive relief.

Coincidentally, when Minnesota passed its revenge porn bill in 2016, it was also considering the codification of the right of publicity under a bill entitled the “Personal Rights In Names Can Endure” (“PRINCE”) Act. But the bill’s sponsor later pulled his draft after critics expressed concerns about the bill’s broad language. One commentator questioned whether such a bill was necessary in light of Hulk Hogan’s victory. Minnesota’s revenge porn civil action arguably combined two separate claims into one, but it also expanded the scope of recovery under either claim so as to now include multiple forms of relief.

Whether the revenge porn civil action will be utilized to any significant degree is as of yet uncertain. The USLS celebration panelists noted—and a brief case search confirms—that courts have yet to extensively apply and interpret the law. From the face of the law, though, it appears that Minnesota is now a hospitable forum for victims of revenge porn, especially celebrities with economically-valuable identities. And due to the state’s broad remedial scheme, I would not be surprised if we eventually see large cases like Hulk Hogan’s in Minnesota courts.

Does getaroom Make U Want 2 BookaRoom?

Posted in Advertising, Articles, Branding, Marketing, Trademarks, USPTO

A tv commercial for yet another hotel booking website just caught my eye, called getaroom:

This one was founded by a pair of lawyers, in fact, the same duo that founded Hotels.com.

I was left wondering whether getaroom is federally-registered, and it is, for “providing travel lodging information services and travel lodging booking agency services for travelers.”

It was registered back in 2011, without any need to show acquired distinctiveness, so it was considered inherently distinctive, I suspect because of the trope and double meaning.

Yet, the getaroom.com website has a very generic and un-branded look to it, and you’d never know the phrase is federally-registered as a trademark, much less a trademark at all.

Then, upon entering your destination and desired stay dates you’re led to a page that invites you to select from a variety of hotel options by clicking on a red button reading “get a room”.

From there, you’re led to a page showing more details about the selected hotel, then you’re invited to “book a room” by clicking on another red button.

I’m left thinking that the folks at getaroom might want to cancel their apparent booking for the use of an all lower case style, especially without the ® registration symbol.

What are the odds that one day getaroom will be groping to maintain its trademark status?

But who would have an interest in caring about that? Then I came across Book A Room, who ironically has no federally-registered rights that I could find in the phrase “Book A Room,” but it does a far better job of making clear trademark use of its chosen name:

In case you’re wondering about who might have prior rights, getaroom claims a first use date in 2009, while Book A Room, asserts it has been online since 1997.

So, would you rather have a room without a trademark or a trademark without a room?

Key: room = registration

Former Rutgers Player Sues Alma Mater Over Nickname

Posted in Infringement

Moving along from Steve’s post on our alma mater of the University of Iowa, a former Rutgers football player has a more negative view of his former school. A few years ago, the Rutgers football program started allowing position groups to choose a nickname. The wide receivers are known as “Flight Crew,” the defensive linemen as “Rude Boyz,” and the offensive line was formerly known as “Soul Train.” Apparently the steam ran out though and the group chose a new name this year: “Rare Breed.” The players and the coaches use the name in social media like Facebook and Twitter. While Wild Turkey appears unconcerned, the new moniker has ruffled the feathers of John Ciurciu, a former Rutgers fullback who has now filed a trademark infringement complaint in the New Jersey U.S. District Court.

Ciurciu founded Rare Breed after he moved on from his playing career. According to the complaint, the company sells a variety of clothing and football gear, becoming popular among high school, college and professional football players. The complaint counts Adrian Peterson and Brian Cushing among NFL players that wear the brand. The company also designs custom apparel for student athletes at Coastal Carolina College. The company owns registered trademarks for the RARE BREED mark in standard character form as well as part of a design mark. The registered design mark is shown below on the left, and the image displayed on Rutgers social media on the right.

The complaint alleges that the use of the image above as well as the use of the hashtags in social media are all instances of trademark infringement and unfair competition. Rare Breed had earlier sent cease and desist letters to Rutgers. The university’s attorney responded by stating that the coaches had been directed to remove the images and hashtags from their social media. While some of the images were removed, some remained. Rare Breed sent a second letter and again the university’s attorney stated that the coach had been directed to remove the use.

It is worth noting that Rutgers has not sold any goods with the image above. However it seems that Rare Breed is concerned that players, especially recruits, might mistakenly believe that the team is sponsored by Rare Breed. The concern seems plausible, even if Rare Breed doesn’t have the same widespread recognition as bigger companies like Adidas or Nike. While we have to wait and see whether Rare Breed can prevail on its claims, one thing is certain. In the age of recruiting via social media, counsel for colleges and universities should discuss intellectual property and other social media issues with their football programs. The Rare Breed – Rutgers dispute is an excellent Exhibit #1. Without proper guidance, lawsuits like this will be anything but rare.

Owning a (Wholesome) Four Letter Word

Posted in Advertising, Articles, Branding, Fashion, Marketing, Trademarks, USPTO

I’m not talking about those kinds of four letter words (by the way, we’re still awaiting the Brunetti decision to learn their fate), so today I’m talking about this wholesome kind:

Inquiring minds may wonder (and interested alumni) how the University of Iowa might go about owning federally-registered rights in the word IOWA to convert that ™ symbol to an ® symbol?

The easiest place to start would be to claim the word has acquired distinctiveness for the typical clothing offerings of a Big Ten University athletic program in combination with the distinctive color combination, gold on black:

 

 

And, black on gold:

But, what about the word only, without being limited by font or the distinctive color combination?

No problem. Judging from another four letter truncation of a University name, it’s doable with a showing of acquired distinctiveness too.

And some may be surprised to know this remains true, even when the truncation constitutes the complete name of a State.

Go ahead and ask Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Nebraska, to name just a few.

Is It Five O’Clock (or 1700 Hours) Somewhere?

Posted in Mixed Bag of Nuts, Trademarks, TTAB

You’re probably familiar with the song “It’s Five O’Clock Somewhere” by Jimmy Buffet and Alan Jackson. It was the number one country single of the year back in 2003. A few years later, Jimmy Buffet submitted several trademark applications based on the song, which are now registered, including for example, IT’S FIVE O’CLOCK SOMEWHERE and IT’S 5 O’CLOCK SOMEWHERE, for restaurant and bar services (Reg. Nos. 4,125,6634,962,176).  The entity Margaritaville Enterprises, LLC (“Margaritaville”) is now listed as the owner of those marks.

Last year, another business, The Veteran Beverage Company, applied to register the mark IT’S 1700 HOURS SOMEWHERE for beer (Serial No. 87160262). In 24-hour military time, 1700 hours is equivalent to 5:00 PM.  However, the Examining Attorney determined that there were no conflicting marks, and approved Veteran Beverage’s mark for publication.

Margaritaville recently stepped in with a Notice of Opposition, filed a few weeks ago, opposing registration of the IT’S 1700 HOURS SOMEWHERE mark.  The Notice of Opposition alleges a likelihood of confusion based on its various 5 O’CLOCK SOMEWHERE marks. Specifically, Margaritaville alleges that the parties’ marks are similar in sight and sound, “identical in meaning,” and “virtually identical in commercial impression,” with the “only difference being that Applicant’s Applied-for Mark shows 5:00 PM in military time.”

Although there are obvious differences in sight and sound of the marks (the words “1700 Hours” instead of “Five O’Clock”), the “similarity in meaning” factor can be just as significant in supporting a likelihood of confusion, especially where there is an identical meaning. See, e.g.Gastown, Inc., of Del. v. Gas City, Ltd., 187 USPQ 760 (TTAB 1975) (holding GAS CITY for gasoline and GASTOWN for gasoline likely to cause confusion); Watercare Corp. v. Midwesco-Enterprise, Inc., 171 USPQ 696 (TTAB 1971) (holding AQUA-CARE (stylized) and WATERCARE (stylized), for water-conditioning products, likely to cause confusion). Thus, this may be a difficult battle for Veteran Beverage. There are potential counterarguments, such as a lack of sufficient relatedness between the parties’ goods and services, although Margaritaville argues that Veteran Beverage’s beer goods are closely related to its restaurant and bar services. What do you think?

The Long and Short of Good Ads

Posted in Advertising, Almost Advice, Branding, Guest Bloggers, Look-For Ads, Marketing

–James Mahoney, Razor’s Edge Communications

Recent travel on Aer Lingus and a perusal of The Boston Sunday Globe brought two very good ads to my attention.

The first, which ran in the Aer Lingus on-board magazine, is a terrific marriage of great concept and excellent execution plus situational relevance: you’re on a plane on your way to Ireland.

As a writer, I love the spot-on call to action in the headline. As a visual communicator, I love the clever blending of the windows (how do people come up with these ideas?!). As a creative director, I love the combination of a smart team working in tandem and hitting the target dead-center.

Bottom line on this one: Even if it’s not the first thing you do, a visit to EPIC, The Irish Emigration Museum gets on your radar and likely becomes a new-found option.

Moving on. So, nobody reads long-copy anymore, eh?

This ad for Needham Bank caught my eye for its sheer flaunting of convention. It’s got lots going for it: A headline that doesn’t look like a headline (the Goliath graphic), opening copy that quickly establishes the premise, sequential subheads that tell the story, and well thought-out, well-written copy that fleshes out the story the subheads outline.

This combination led me to read the darn thing, despite not living close enough to Needham to be a prospect even if I were in the market for a new bank.

The only quibble I have is there’s no contact information. A website address and a phone number would have put the cherry on top. As it is, interested people have to be motivated enough to seek that information out themselves.

One final point, and it’s an important one, is to pass along atta-boys not just to the creative team, but also to whomever in the bank had the courage to approve the concept and the ad. Often we hear that clients want to do something different, to stand out from the crowd. And nearly as often, they get cold feet when we give them an option like that.

But this ad proves that when you have the goods, and you have the guts, you get the glory. Needham Bank reports that the ad response is exceeding their expectations.

What Are You Thinking, Coke Zero?

Posted in Advertising, Articles, Branding, Food, Genericide, Loss of Rights, Marketing, Trademarks, TTAB

 

The above advertising billboard is plastered all over the Twin Cities at the moment, and it got me thinking, so here I am, once again, writing about Coke Zero, remember this can?

Coke obtained a favorable decision from the TTAB early last year, ruling that ZERO is not generic for a soft drink category, instead it is descriptive and Coke has secondary meaning in it.

So, why on earth has Coke positioned SUGAR immediately next to the word ZERO beneath the Coca-Cola script in widespread billboard advertising and packaging?

Putting the key trademark issue aside, it doesn’t even look like there is a good business case for it?

Had the above billboard advertisement and depicted bottle been part of the TTAB case decided last year, instead of specimens like the above can, seems probable we’d have seen a different result.

Has Coke forgotten that like functionality for non-traditional trademarks, genericness can be raised as a validity challenge for word marks, at any time?

Coke Zero, welcome to the Genericide Watch.

“Hook and Loop” Meet Chutes and Ladders

Posted in Articles, Branding, Genericide, Loss of Rights, Marketing, Technology, Trademarks

Nearly everyone in the IP community is talking about the hilarious viral Velcro music video released last week. Hat tip to Patently-O, Martha, and Brett. The “behind the scenes” video is here.

We’ve spoken before about nervous trademark types, behind the scenes doing their level best, and taking steps to try to avoid unwanted genericide of the trademarks they are charged to protect:

“Nervous, I say, because these types of advertisements frequently are designed to help prevent unwanted genericide of a trademark. The idea generally is, let’s show and create a record that we are educating the public about our trademark rights and hopefully deterring misuses that otherwise might find their way into the public eye and influence the relevant public’s understanding of a term or symbol as being generic and part of the public domain, free for anyone to use, even competitors.”

Velcro has been on our Genericide Watch list, and Wikipedia notes it is a trademark frequently used as a generic term. So, hats off to Velcro for letting their attorneys’ hairs down on this one.

And congrats to Penn Holderness and the rest of the WalkWest creative team, for helping give the impression in the Velcro video that at least some nervous lawyers can still have a sense of humor.

Julie Barry, Director of Global Brand, Velcro Companies, explained the Velcro video in this way:

“We’re here in North Carolina, shooting our ‘We are the World’ video which is an educational video explaining to folks details about the Velcro brand trademark and why it’s important that people refer to the mechanical fastener as ‘hook and loop.'”

Actors posing as lawyers, flanked by real Velcro lawyers, appear agitated at times, imploring listeners to not say Velcro, but instead “hook and loop,” or “our trademark will get killed,” “we’ll lose our circle ®,” and “our trademark goes away.” At the same time, Velcro is fully admitting the “First World” melodramatic nature of this worst case scenario and unfortunate situation.

Maybe it’s just me, but I’ve never heard of a “hook and loop” fastener before now, so the video certainly accomplished that bit of education. I’d be surprised, however, if the video moves folks to embrace the stiff and clunky six syllable “hook and loop fastener” generic phrase, over Velcro.

Perhaps what follows is one small example of where I’ve captured “at least some of the sparks” spinning from my mind’s eye, so please bear with me, but as I watched and listened to the Velcro video more times than I’d like to admit (kind of an addictive musical hook), the rapid repetition of “hook and loop” triggered thoughts of “hook and ladder,” then “chutes and ladders,” and how ladders can lead up to rewards while chutes can take you for a ride straight to the bottom:

Given those stark alternatives, given how a brand that deteriorates to the point that its primary meaning is perceived to be more generic than it is perceived a brand (is not a brand at all, under the law), and given a trademark owner’s understandable desire to try and influence and build up the primary brand meaning among the relevant consuming public, it’s worth asking whether the humorous Velcro video helps to move that critical needle. In other words, does it act as a ladder?

We’ve cautioned before that a brand designed to launch an entirely new category must also spend valuable time and effort in creating and donating to the public, an acceptable generic term that the public easily can embrace, so when the applicable patents expire and exclusivity is lost, the trademark doesn’t travel straight down the chute to genericness:

Brand owners launching a new category of product or service do well to design a simple generic category name too.”

“Remember how it took Rollerblade an entire decade to come up with “in-line skates”?  Before that, the generic name it adopted at the USPTO was “boots equipped with longitudinally aligned rollers used for skating and skiing,” leading to a multitude of generic Rollerblading misuses.”

Is “hook and loop” going to get the job done? Will it help prevent a death by a thousand cuts?

“Hook and loop” is certainly more of a ladder, even a rescue “hook and ladder,” than the extreme generic identification of goods found in the first Velcro trademark application from 1957:

“NOTION-NAMELY, A SYNTHETIC MATERIAL SOLD IN RIBBON, SHEET, OR PIECE GOODS FORM, SAID MATERIAL HAVING COMPLEMENTAL PARTS WHICH ADHERE TO EACH OTHER WHEN PRESSED TOGETHER AND ADAPTED FOR USE AS A CLOSURE, FASTENER, OR BUTTON FOR CLOSING GARMENTS, CURTAINS, OR THE LIKE”

And, unlike Rollerblade who seriously delayed in donating a bite-size generic category term to the general public (“in-line skates”), Velcro seems to have been fully invested in “hook and loop” going all the way back to at least as early as 1975. Query whether the entry of the “hook and loop fastener” phrase closely tracks the lapsing of the patents (as the video mentions) “forty years ago.” If so, perhaps it still came twenty years too late?

Either way, I’m seriously wondering whether Velcro’s tongue-in-cheek reference to a “scratchy and hairy fastener” might be more easily and readily embraced by today’s general public as the generic alternative to genuine Velcro branded products.

I’m also left thinking that the video begs the question of who is the intended audience. In other words, who are the “folks” that Velcro would like to reach with this creative video?

I’ve always thought of Velcro as more of a B2B brand, but in researching this post, I see that I’ve missed some of their general consumer products, like general purpose straps, general purpose plastic bagschildren’s toy blocks, adhesive cementmedical splints, and hair rollers, for example.

Contractual efforts are probably the most effective way of controlling how the Velcro trademark is used by those who purchase authentic product from Velcro and incorporate Velcro fasteners into their own consumer products. And, when it comes to competitors who might be inclined to misuse the Velcro trademark, the cease and desist letter, and/or lawsuit is probably most effective.

So, perhaps the general public is the intended audience of this educational effort. If so, I’m not sure the effort anticipated how many in the general public don’t like to be told what to say and do.

Moreover, let’s face it, the video’s referenced “trademark laws being broken,” aren’t being broken by the general public speaking about the brand or a competitor’s alternatives to the brand. Nor are they being broken by the media who reports and writes about all kinds of things and happens to use “velcro” in lower case and in a generic sense.

I do seriously hope the video will strike the right chord with these important audiences, as they will have a significant impact on whether the brand is able to climb the ladder of distinctiveness and fame or slides down the chute to genericness.

For those still with me and wondering, while I’ve questioned the seriousness of the risk for genericide when intentional and controlled brand-verbing is involved (and the 9th Circuit’s recent decision affirming the survival of the Google trademark appears to validate the difficulty of bringing a trademark all the way to the ground zero), the Velcro mark seems different, as the generic uses don’t involve verbing, they go straight to nouning and naming what the product is, by the way, a far more efficient name for a “hook and loop” or “scratchy and hairy” fastener.

Which of the present options are most likely to roll off the tongues of those who matter?

Federal Trademark Registration, the First Amendment, and Freedom of Speech: Part III

Posted in Articles, Branding, Dilution, Fair Use, Famous Marks, First Amendment, Marketing, Trademarks, TTAB, USPTO

Of course, loyal readers have been eagerly awaiting Part III of the series (see Part I and Part II) focusing on Tam’s intersection of federal trademark registration and the First Amendment.

In terms of the certain and practical implications flowing from the decision, it opens the door to a host of new trademark applications containing religious and racial slurs, including the N-word.

Perhaps this explains, in part, why the Justice Department flipflopped on the issue and now says that the “scandalous and immoral” provision of Section 2(a) actually can survive Matal v. Tam.

If the Federal Circuit allows the “scandalous and immoral” provision to survive Tam and attempts to craft some sort of reasoning as to why it should be treated differently than disparagement, we’ve already pointed to how that may impact pending and suspended refusals of the R-Word.

On the other hand, if the Federal Circuit eliminates “scandalous and immoral” registration refusals relying on the Supreme Court’s Tam decision, as consistency of analysis would seem to require, how many of the newly filed scandalous marks actually will be published in the Official Gazette?

Another interesting question might be whether any of these obviously offensive applications will satisfy the essential predicates to registration, and actually adorn the Principal Register, with official Certificates of Registration issued in the name of the United States of America?

It’s worth asking whether the Supreme Court’s destruction of the even-handed framework that the USPTO devised in applying the disparagement provision of Section 2(a) (conscious of favoring neither side on an issue and determined to ignore an Applicant’s intent), inevitably will lead to selectively enforced analyses above the table driven by emotions residing beneath the table.

One area for concern might be the Trademark Office’s growing interest in refusing registration of matter deemed merely informational; presumed “incapable” of performing a trademark function. I’m left wondering, how tempting might it be to use this rather blunt tool on seriously offensive subject matter after Section 2(a) has been stripped of its previous reach in denying registration?

Having said that, will or should the Trademark Office reassess Exam Guide 2-17, concerning Merely Informational Matter, in light of the Tam Court’s perspective on viewpoint discrimination. Seems like it should to me. So, I’m also left wondering, exactly how might “merely informational matter” not express a viewpoint, making such a refusal presumptively invalid?

Since the federal government is apparently powerless to prevent the registration of disparaging trademarks because doing so constitutes viewpoint discrimination that cannot withstand strict scrutiny, what is the fate of federal dilution law, especially the provisions against tarnishment of famous marks? Wes noted some serious questions, others have too, here, here, and here.

In particular, Justice Alito labeled the disparagement registration ban as a “happy-talk clause,” adding that “[g]iving offense is a viewpoint,” and Justice Kennedy reinforced that viewpoint, saying: “To prohibit all sides from criticizing their opponents makes a law more viewpoint based, not less so.” Given that clarity, does this defecating dog trademark not express a viewpoint too?

The Applicant defended Greyhound’s opposition, in part, by arguing that “reasonable people would not be offended because the mark mocks the craze for shirts bearing prestigious emblems.” Doesn’t that sound a lot like a viewpoint being expressed with the defecating dog trademark?

Yet, in rejecting the Applicant’s arguments, and in granting Greyhound summary judgment and refusing registration of the defecating dog mark, the TTAB concluded, back in 1988:

“We do not find applicant’s arguments to be persuasive. Even assuming that people are not offended by the sight of a dog defecating on the ground, applicant’s mark, used on its goods, is a dog defecating on a shirt. This certainly produces a different effect from the viewing of a dog defecating in its normal environment.”

“Further, applicant admits that some people would find the depiction of feces in the mark offensive and that people ‘expect to find something a little out of the ordinary when they see this type of applique.’ In effect, applicant is admitting that the mark has a shock value, and we view the shock to be the offensiveness of the depiction.” (citation omitted)

Does this not constitute “giving offense” and isn’t it fair to say, it “expresses ideas that offend” — to use Justice Alito’s words? Do shocking images and content not convey a viewpoint?

Justice Kennedy stated the disparagement provision “reflects the Government’s disapproval of a subset of messages it finds offensive. This is the essence of viewpoint discrimination.”

He went on to say:

“Unlike content based discrimination, discrimination based on viewpoint, including a regulation that targets speech for its offensiveness, remains of serious concern in the commercial context.”

If so, and if the “scandalous and immoral” provision of Section 2(a) does not survive Constitutional scrutiny in Brunetti, then how does Greyhound, or any other owner of a famous brand, prevent registration (and use) of trademarks designed to express a negative viewpoint about a famous brand while also serving as a trademark for Applicant’s own goods and/or services?

And, what about the below RED SOX/SEX ROD example? The TTAB ruled that the stylized SEX ROD mark “would be viewed as a sexually vulgar version of the club’s symbol and as making an offensive comment on or about the club.” That sounds like viewpoint discrimination too. So, on what basis can the Boston Red Sox object with the disparagement provision gone, and if dilution by tarnishment is also considered unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination?

Can dilution tarnishment survive the Tam Court’s strict scrutiny against viewpoint discrimination?