Duets Blog : Creativity and the Law: DuetsBlog

Thinking about filing a trademark opposition against a competitor’s pending trademark application? Thinking about filing a civil suit against a competitor’s corresponding trademark use? Often, upon the filing of a civil trademark suit and a request to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”), the TTAB will suspend the opposition pending the disposition of the civil suit. Generally, the expectation is that the civil suit will wrap up within a few years, sometimes rendering the subject of the opposition proceeding moot.

But from time to time it is possible for a civil suit to linger – causing its corresponding TTAB action to do the same. The most notorious of such cases (at present) is United Black Fund v. National Black United Fund, Inc., Cancellation No. 92013503. The cancellation proceeding was filed in 1982 and suspending in 1984 pending the outcome of a corresponding civil action in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The lawsuit was administratively closed by the court in order to allow “the parties the opportunity to resolve their differences.” If my calculations are right, the parties have provided the TTAB with at least 10 status reports since suspending the action corresponding to the TTAB’s inquiries into the civil suit every two or three years over the past 25 years or so.

The petitioner’s most recent filing indicates that the civil suit remained administratively closed as of December 2009 and that the parties were engaged in settlement talks. The United Black Fund has used its mark in connection with fundraising activities since 1969, while the Black United Fund has done so since 1977. Both continue to offer those same services today, as seen here and here, presumably without any settlement regarding how the parties may use their marks. It would seem that this 28-year-long saga has played itself out, but only time will tell.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

A few weeks ago, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision in The University of South Carolina v. the University of Southern California in South Carolina’s appeal from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”).  The Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s finding that consumers are likely to be confused by South Carolina’s use of this design on clothing:



And Southern California’s use of this design on clothing:



I’ve written before about the lucrative field of collegiate sports merchandising.  Given the millions of dollars at stake, it’s therefore no surprise that these universities have spent thousands upon thousands of dollars taking this case to the Court of Appeals; it’s also no surprise that South Carolina is considering an appeal to the Supreme Court.  

In reaching its decision, the Federal Circuit considered many of the usual arguments – such as the parties respective channels of trade (found to be similar), the conditions under which consumers would purchase the parties’ respective merchandise (found to be similar), and the parties’ simultaneous use of their marks in commerce without confusion (found to be insignificant).  In fleshing out this argument, the Court noted a number points that would seem to work against a finding of likely confusion: the schools are located on opposite sides of the country, many collegiate sports fans are sophisticated when it comes to recognizing their teams, and no instance of actual confusion has been reported.  Moreover, South Carolina presented evidence that at least sixteen other universities and colleges represent themselves as SC, indicating that college students and sports fans are sufficiently knowledgeable to recognize their desired school.  (Notably, the parties were able to come to an agreement regarding concurrent use of the mark USC in connection with education services, with Southern California taking Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada, Idaho, Arizona, Utah, Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, New Mexico, Texas, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Massachusetts, Illinois, and Hawaii and South Carolina taking Wisconsin, Mississippi, Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Maryland, New York, Arkansas, Louisiana, Connecticut, Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Florida, Rhode Island, Delaware, the District of Columbia and, interestingly, Alaska).

Nevertheless, the Court upheld the TTAB’s finding that, as the disputed marks are “legally identical,” there is a likelihood of consumer confusion among them.  As a result, South Carolina’s application to register its design mark has been refused.  While this decision does not prevent South Carolina from using its design mark in connection with merchandise, it does deprive South Carolina of the benefits of registration – including the ability to enforce infringing use of its own mark nationwide.  

In a nice article on this matter, the Los Angeles Times has queried, “Would a reasonable person confuse a USC logo on a garnet-and-black ball cap in Columbia, S.C., with the same letters on cardinal-and-gold sportswear worn by a Trojans fan at the Coliseum?”

What do you think?

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

A lot can be learned from the easily searched trademark registrations existing on the United States Patent and Trademark Office's online database. For example, Examining Attorneys at the USPTO will refuse registration based on prior confusingly similar registered marks, so responsible trademark owners will conduct the necessary searching and due diligence prior to adoption and first use. In addition, because searching the USPTO's database can yield readily available evidence on a number of substantive issues important to trademark types and brand owners, third-party trademark registrations are a very tempting tool to use to try to prove a point.

As frustrating as it can be to trademark types and the brand owners they represent, third-party registrations cannot be used as legal precedent to try and compel a certain result. Such attempts easily are rebuffed at the USPTO since each application must be decided on its own merits and one Examining Attorney is not bound by the "mistakes" that may have been made by other Examining Attorneys at the USPTO. As a result, although consistency is a goal at the USPTO, it can be rather elusive at times. Having said that, third-party trademark registration evidence can have evidentiary value, if used properly, and the valid and acceptable use of third-party registration evidence has grown over time.

Third-party registrations have been considered relevant and probative in establishing a number of different and important trademark issues, including at least:

1. The likely meaning of a mark to consumers. Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc., 534 F.2d 915 (CCPA 1976). 
2. That goods or services are of a type that consumers may believe emanate from a single source. In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785 (TTAB 1993).
3. The likely meaning of a mark to consumers, i.e., whether it is merely descriptive or suggestive. Plus Products v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 220 USPQ 541 (TTAB 1983).
4. That a mark is relatively weak and that consumers will rely on other matter to distinguish between marks. Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369 (CAFC 2005).
5. The existence of a relevant industry practice. Stuart Spector Designs, Ltd. et al. v. Fender Musical Instrument Corporation, 2009 WL 804142 (TTAB March 25, 2009) (finding the third-party registrations for guitar body designs supported the applicant's position that the USPTO recognizes guitar body designs as capable of indicating source and the industry's practice of registering guitar body designs); In re The Black & Decker Corp., 81 USPQ2d 1841 (TTAB 2006) (finding industry practice to use key head design as source indicator).

A couple of days ago I posted about a trademark specimen case, one where I was hoping the TTAB would expand the valid use of third-party registration evidence, but unfortunately, the TTAB did not acknowledge or address the third-party trademark registration evidence that was submitted (along with the specimens of use supporting those standard character word-only trademark registrations). Perhaps someone else can benefit from these thoughts in arguing for additional expanded use of third-party registrations in their trademark registration cases.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

An in-depth focus on arguably the most important trademark issue to brand owners and their trademark counsel. The seminar will focus on the many faces of trademark confusion, with a special focus on initial interest confusion, reverse confusion, survey evidence, and post-sale confusion theories.

Promises to be a good program, we hope you join us, special guests Ron Coleman and Nancy Friedman will be in town, and Paul Mussell from Wells Fargo, see here for the link on the Minnesota Continuing Legal Education website. See here for a pdf of the brochure, please check it out.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

John Welch, over at the TTABlog, reported on a recent trademark specimen of use case (pdf here); one near and dear to my heart, since I represented the Applicant seeking to register the composite word-only mark DELI EXPRESS SAN LUIS for sweet rolls. At issue in the case was whether the product label specimen (appearing below) shows use of the DELI EXPRESS SAN LUIS word-only mark as set forth in the standard character drawing of the trademark application:

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), in what it admitted to be a "necessarily subjective" analysis, examined the product label specimen -- and on that basis alone -- concluded it does not show use of the claimed DELI EXPRESS SAN LUIS mark:

Here, we agree with the examining attorney that the specimen depicts the two literal portions DELI EXPRESS and SAN LUIS in such a manner that consumers would not perceive them as constituting a single composite mark. First, the DELI EXPRESS portion is not only in a different font but is contained within a yellow-background, and then a larger red background, separated from the remainder of the packaging design by a black bar outlining the top left corner of the package. The other literal portion, SAN LUIS, is outside of that border area and is further separated by a fanciful triangle design and placed upon a green background. The term CONCHA appears below these two elements in a lighter green box. Taken together, we find that the impression left by this specimen is that the two elements, DELI EXPRESS and SAN LUIS, are two separate trademarks rather than the single mark shown on the drawing page (emphasis added).

I respectfully submit that these kinds of determinations -- especially since they are admittedly and "necessarily subjective" -- are not binary, either-or propositions. For example, it is entirely possible for a single specimen to show two trademarks that function as separate individual trademarks and also function together in the same specimen as a unitary word-only composite mark (see third-party registration examples below the jump).

Here, it seems to me, that the specimen in question shows multiple word-only marks (among others too, when designs and stylization is considered), including DELI EXPRESS, SAN LUIS, and the composite of those words, DELI EXPRESS SAN LUIS. Indeed, if a consumer were shown the product label and asked what brand of concha or sweet roll this is, it would be entirely reasonable and appropriate to answer: DELI EXPRESS SAN LUIS. If so, how can it be that the specimen does not show use of the claimed mark?

Given that the drawing shows the mark sought to be registered by applicant (TMEP 807; 37 CFR 2.52), given that applicants enjoy some latitude in choosing the mark to register and include in the drawing (TMEP 807.12(d)), given that the main purpose of the drawing is to provide notice of the nature of the mark sought to be registered (TMEP 807), given that the mark shown in a standard character word-only drawing need not appear on the specimen in the same font, style, size, or color (TMEP 807.03(e)), given that the USPTO actually encourages applicants to use standard character drawings (TMEP 807.04(b)), given that a standard character drawing is a quick and efficient way of showing the essence of a verbal mark (TMEP 807.04(b)), and given the "necessarily subjective" nature of the determination, I submit that the appropriate test for determining whether the specimen shows use of the verbal, word-only mark claimed in the standard character drawing, is whether it would be reasonable for consumers to request applicant's product by the claimed trademark, given what actually appears on the specimen.

In other words, how might consumers request applicant's sweet roll product? Again, I submit it is entirely reasonable that consumers who have seen the product label would request the product by asking for a "DELI EXPRESS SAN LUIS concha or sweet roll." Now, while they might also request a "DELI EXPRESS" concha or sweet roll, or perhaps a SAN LUIS concha or sweet roll, the most complete, accurate, and precise way to request the product would be to ask for a "DELI EXPRESS SAN LUIS" brand concha or sweet roll, and also thereby treat the words as a unitary composite mark, because:

1. The DELI EXPRESS house brand (and primary brand) and the SAN LUIS secondary or sub-brand are the only brands and word-marks on the entire label;
2. They appear proximate to one another, side-by-side on the same horizontal plane, at the top of the label, for easy, conventional reading from left to right;
3. They form the dominant portion of the label since the design elements can't be spoken;
4. The DELI EXPRESS phrase appears in solid black lettering on a yellow-background, and the SAN LUIS phrase has a black-outlined border and it stems from a triangle design element matching the same yellow-background carrying the DELI EXPRESS phrase;
5. There is no requirement to include generic words as part of the claimed mark, i.e., concha or sweet roll;
6. Consumers familiar with applicant's products are accustomed to similar label formats where the DELI EXPRESS house brand is proximately positioned with other sub-brands like SUPER MEGA, SNACKERS, COFFEES OF THE WORLD, and SUB SELECTS, to form federally-registered word-only standard character trademarks: DELI EXPRESS SUPER MEGA, DELI EXPRESS SNACKERS, DELI EXPRESS COFFEES OF THE WORLD, and DELI EXPRESS SUB SELECTS; and
7. Consumers of packaged food products have been conditioned to perceive house marks and secondary marks as not only having separate trademark significance from each other, but also significance together, in the same specimen, even when different colors, styles and fonts may be used for each or portions of each, and even when other matter or wording may appear between them(see third-party registration evidence below the jump).

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (2)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

A recent domain name decision under ICANN's Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP Policy), captioned Bin Shabib & Associates (BSA) LLP v. Hebei IT Shanghai ltd c/o Domain Administrator, found reverse domain name hijacking, under some rather interesting, if not questionable circumstances. The Rules that govern the UDRP Policy define Reverse Domain Name HiJacking as "using the Policy in bad faith to attempt to deprive a registered domain-name holder of a domain name." 

What caught my eye was the three-member panel's use of the ill-fated "knew or should have known" phrase in finding the requisite "bad faith" for hijacking; a phrase well-known to those who follow the trademark fraud case law and appreciate that recently this same "should have known" standard was flatly rejected by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in In re Bose, as being nothing more than a test for simple negligence. For more on the In re Bose decision, see here and here.

The Bin Shabib & Associates three-member panel, assigned by NAF, was unpersuaded that complainant had proven common law trademark rights in the acronym BSA (under the first UDRP element), so it declined -- as unnecessary -- to make any findings on the second and third elements under the UDRP, namely, the "lack of legitimate interest" and "bad faith" elements. Despite making no findings on either of these two key elements, the panel held as follows:

Also, the Panel finds that Complainant knew or should have known that it was unable to prove that Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name or that Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith. Based on the foregoing, the panel finds that reverse domain name hijacking has occurred. See NetDepositVerkaik v. Crownonlinemedia.com, D2001-1502 (WIPO Mar. 19, 2002) (“To establish reverse domain name hijacking, Respondent must show knowledge on the part of the complainant of the Respondent’s right or legitimate interest in the Domain Name and evidence of harassment or similar conduct by the Complainant in the fact of such knowledge.”); see also Labrada Bodybuilding Nutrition, Inc. v. Glisson, FA 250232 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 28, 2004) (finding that complainant engaged in reverse domain name hijacking where it used “the Policy as a tool to simply wrest the disputed domain name in spite of its knowledge that the Complainant was not entitled to that name and hence had no colorable claim under the Policy”) (emphasis added).

A couple of curious points are worth discussion. First, putting aside for a moment the dubious "should have known" standard of bad faith, how can complainant be guilty of "bad faith" -- sufficient for hijacking -- in failing to appreciate that it had no chance of proving the very two elements for which the panel made no findings? Second, neither of the quoted parentheticals go far enough to support the quoted  "should have known" standard; instead, both speak only of actual knowledge.

As it turns out, however, there is some prior WIPO panel support for the "should have known" standard in finding "bad faith" sufficient for reverse domain name hijacking. Nevertheless, in each of these decisions, the panels made findings on all three UDRP elements before finding "bad faith" and ruling in favor of a claim for reverse domain name hijacking, see here, here, and here.

So, what do you think? Is the "should have known" standard defensible in reverse domain name hijacking decisions? If not, what about gross negligence? How about reckless disregard? What is the appropriate level of culpability? Does it even matter, or is a hijacking finding "of little import" to most complainants?

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Today, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the requested appeal of Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., the nearly two-decade old trademark case seeking cancellation of the U.S. Trademark Registrations owned by the NFL franchise in the Nation's Capitol. In doing so, the highest Court in the land, has permitted the laches ruling to stand. Basically, permitting dismissal of the action given a perceived "unreasonable delay" by the Native American Petitioners in bringing the trademark challenge, despite clear language in the Trademark Act permitting such challenges outside the typical five year statute of limitations, and specifically indicating they can be filed "at any time."

My prior involvement in filing the case back in 1992, the victory we all enjoyed in 1999, and my admittedly rather critical coverage of the dismissal of this historic and ground-breaking case may be found here (9/17/09) and here (May 21, 2009).

Although many ironies may be highlighted from this odd conclusion to the Harjo case, certainly one of the most striking ironies is that it took far longer for this case to wind its way through our legal system than the accused delay by Mateo Romero, the youngest of the original Native American Petitioners, led by Suzan Shown Harjo.

Be that as it may, the torch has been passed to a brand new generation of Native American Petitioners, eager to have the case decided on the merits. The "new" case filed by Amanda Blackhorse and others, more than three years ago, was promptly suspended, pending the final outcome in the Harjo case. Now that the Harjo case has concluded, the Blackhorse case will proceed before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the same admininstrative body that found in favor of Harjo's disparagement claim in 1999.

Moreover, the TTAB appears to have read the news accounts and just today issued an order, indicating that if the parties to the Blackhorse proceeding don't advise it of the status of the Harjo case within thirty days, it will automatically resume the Blackhorse proceeding and issue a new scheduling order to move the case forward, so stay tuned.

OK, here is my prediction. Some day, I don't know when, justice will prevail, and some talented branding guru will make a tidy sum re-naming and re-branding this offensive NFL franchise name that could have and should have been re-named long ago.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Trademark types: As promised, here are some of my more detailed thoughts and perspectives (at least for the time being) on the most significant trademark case of the year: In re Bose.

Thanks to Thomson Reuters for asking me to share them with their readers. I look forward to some great dialogue on the likely implications resulting from this long-anticipated trademark fraud decision.

Marketing types: An adversary's ability to cancel your company's trademark registration for fraud just got much more difficult with this important Bose decision. Basically, fraud means fraud again.

Instead of your adversary only needing to prove that you should have known that a material statement made to the Trademark Office actually was false at the time you made it (as was the law applied by the U.S. Trademark Office for the last six years), now, simple negligence is no longer enough to establish trademark fraud, instead, an actual intent-to-deceive the Trademark Office must be proven.

Having said that, despite this revived more difficult-to-prove fraud standard, it is as important as ever to treat the statements or representations you make to the Trademark Office as seriously as ever, and with the utmost solemnity, making sure you truly understand what you are signing so you can actually affirm the truth of those statements and representations.

It probably goes without saying that the apparent simplicity of the electronic trademark forms can be quite deceiving. So, there are no stupid questions when it comes to your understanding before signing electronic form documents that are submitted to the Trademark Office.

UPDATE: ExecSense Webinar on the Bose Decision, now available for purchase. Just so you know, all royalties due to me are being donated to The Ronald McDonald House Charity.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Back in May, I wrote a piece entitled "Re-Branding Madness in Washington" Overlooks Obvious: The Washington Redskins," discussing the trademark cancellation action that I filed on behalf of seven prominent Native American leaders back in September 1992 (Harjo et al v. Pro-Football, Inc.), and calling for the football team to "hire a branding guru to engage in some serious and successful re-branding."

Well, the 2009 football season is now upon us, and it appears my re-branding call has fallen on deaf ears, at least for now.

Yesterday the Washington Post "reported" the case may be heard by the U.S. Supreme Court.

What I found most interesting about the brief 197 word story in the Washington Post is that the "reporter" used the word "activist" three times and "group" twice, to describe the distinguished Native American leaders I know, without referring to them as individuals or even as being Native American (without the "activist" pejorative), leading me to wonder what yard-line his seats might be located at in FedEx Field.

For what it's worth, at least the Associated Press, ABC News, NBC Sports, ESPN, Yahoo News, WTOP.com, WUSA9.com, New York Times, New York Post, Miami Herald, San Francisco Chronicle, Seattle Times, Sports Illustrated, The Washington Times, and CBS News, have all managed to report the story without employing the highly-charged and politically-loaded term "activist," instead neutrally referring to the petitioners as "Native Americans" and "American Indians," who are offended by the team name.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Today is a really, really big day for trademark types.

As many of us have been saying for a couple of years now, trademark fraud (i.e., fraud on the U.S. Trademark Office) continues to be one of the hottest issues facing trademark owners and the attorneys who represent them. Perhaps after today, not so much, but who really knows, we'll see.

For those not already plugged into the issue of trademark fraud, most mark the 2003 decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) in Medinol v. Neuro Vasx, as the starting point for a much lower, and easier to prove, standard of fraud.

After Medinol, if a trademark owner knew or "should have known" it made a material false statement to the Trademark Office, the entire resulting trademark registration was subject to cancellation at any time. Since then, and following the reasoning in Medinol, the TTAB issued numerous decisions granting opposition or cancellation of trademark applications and registrations on fraud grounds, causing trademark owners and their attorneys great concern with what many have called a strict liability standard, not one based upon an actual "intent to deceive" the U.S. Trademark Office. Most of these cases have fallen into the "overinclusive" goods and services category of fraud cases -- basically, cases having sworn statements that the applied-for mark is currently in use in connection with all of the listed goods and services, when in fact, something less than all the goods or services are actually in use with the mark.

For those interested on the development of the trademark fraud issue, here is a pdf of my slides for a talk I gave in January 2008, at LAIPLA's Washington in the West continuing education conference.

As some of you may recall, during several of my talks over the last two years, I have figuratively flashed a yellow light and cautioned that the CAFC -- the TTAB's primary reviewing court --  has not been heard on the subject of trademark fraud for quite some time, and it has not been clear to me that the CAFC actually would endorse the TTAB's easier to prove fraud standard in the Medinol line of cases. Today the CAFC weighed in on the subject.

Earlier today, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) decided In re Bose, a long-anticipated decision on what it takes to establish fraud before the U.S. Trademark Office. In doing so, the CAFC flashed a red light, indicating the TTAB had read "too broadly" prior CAFC precedent that had mentioned the words "should have known," and it specifically reaffirmed "that a trademark is obtained fraudulently under the Lanham Act only if the applicant or registrant knowingly makes a false, material representation with the intent to deceive the PTO," and it further redirected the TTAB: "Unless the challenger can point to evidence to support an inference of deceptive intent, it has failed to satisfy the clear and convincing evidence standard required to establish a fraud claim."

So, after today, trademark fraud still exists, and it can be proven, provided it is "proven to the hilt," with "clear and convincing evidence," leaving "no room for speculation, inference or surmise," and so long as "any doubt must be resolved against the charging party." Basically, "deception must be willful to constitute fraud." [Here is a link to a pdf of the CAFC's Bose decision].

Hat tip to John Welch of the TTABlog for alerting his followers of the CAFC's decision published first thing in the morning today.

My more detailed perspectives about the CAFC's Bose decision will follow later.

Also, stay tuned, because we continue to await the CAFC's fraud decision that it is currently reviewing in Grand Canyon West Ranch, LLC v. Hualapai Tribe.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Now that the Tour de France is over, it looks like the choices in evening television once again consist of several versions of the same reality show.  I can’t complain, the Tour was phenomenal this year and I enjoyed every minute I was able to watch (thank you DVR). 

Last week, as the 2009 le Tour de France raged on, the TTAB issued another loss for product configuration marks everywhere, affirming a refusal to register a product configuration mark for bicycle wheels (In re Rolf Dietrich).  The applicant, Rolf Dietrich, described the mark as a specific spoke pattern which created diamond shaped regions between the rim and hub. 

The Board concluded the proposed mark was functional and thus unregistrable, noting no amount of 2(f) evidence (acquired distinctiveness) would be sufficient to overcome a functionality refusal.  The applicant’s attempt to draft off of its existing, incontestable, registration for a highly similar design was of no further assistance.  In fact, the Board went so far as to note the applicant’s incontestable registration was subject to cancellation on the ground of functionality at any time.  

The Board focused on evidence of utility patents owned by applicant relating to bicycle wheels, which it found to be sufficient to establish a prima facie case that the design was functional.  In summary, it is becoming quite clear that an attempt to register a product configuration covered by a utility patent will likely result in spinning your wheels and will simply die in the mountains. 

For a summary of the best Tour moments, see Phil’s Top 5 Most Amazing Tour Moments. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Tough times call for tough decisions. Brand managers know this as well as anyone, and they are certainly facing some very tough decisions during these challenging economic times.

Sometimes shrinking the workforce is considered to be in the best interest of the brand. For example, last week, Carter's, the parent company of OshKosh B'Gosh, announced that it would be trimming the workforce in order to improve the efficiency and profitability of the iconic -- and more than century old -- brand.

Brand managers also may be asked to re-evaluate their brand protection strategies in order to cut costs. Given a recent competing brand that appears to have gone unchallenged by OshKosh B'Gosh®, one has to wonder if there is a willingness to shrink the B'Gosh® brand in addition to the workforce.

Returning from a trip to Washington, D.C., for a pair of oral arguments at the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), I did some speed-shopping for my daughter at a neat little boutique in Bethesda, Maryland, called The Blue House (I highly recommend it). Without paying attention to brand at all, or even looking at the hangtag or label (okay, I had to catch a plane), I picked up a really cute outfit I thought she'd just love. I was actually right, this time. In fact, she is so taken by it and some other items sold under this brand online, she not very happy that I am writing this post right now. Oh well, duty calls.

Anyway, when I got home and unpacked the outfit I noticed the hangtag for the first time, and honestly, my first thought was, is this a modern rendition of the B'Gosh® brand? After a closer look, I began to wonder whether it is an extension or somehow related to the B'Gosh® brand? It wasn't until visiting the brand's website and conducting some searches on the Trademark Office database that I was able to satisfy myself, no apparent connection. In case you're wondering, no image of the outfit, but I did scan an image of the hangtag and it is viewable after the jump. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link