Seth Godin on Trademark?

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Seth Godin has an amazing knack for creating and spreading ideas that matter, mostly really good ones, by the way. I always look forward to his daily riffs and I have been known to spread some of his important ideas too when they overlap with things I happen to care a lot about.

When it comes to Mr. Godin's trademark advice, however, I'm not feeling it, sorry (that wasn't an apology either). Some of it is, well, lacking an indispensable quality. Even when it is accompanied by this witty disclaimer: "I'm not a lawyer. I don't even play one on TV. If you rely on my legal advice, you're getting exactly what you paid for."

The problem is, sometimes you end up getting much less than you anticipated and actually end up much worse off, when you follow down even a "free" path based on misunderstandings and misconceptions, at least as they relate to one's legal rights.

I'll never forget one evening watching Geraldo Live during the O.J. trial, more than fifteen years ago, as a young trademark lawyer. There was quite a stir about some trademark applications Mr. Simpson had filed for O.J. Simpson, Juice, and O.J., around the time of O.J. Simpson being charged with the murder of Nicole Simpson. I recall one of Simpson's defense lawyers, the brilliant constitutional lawyer Alan Dershowitz, rebuffing criticism about the trademark filings, unwittingly contending that Simpson never intended to use or benefit from those applications, he simply filed them to make sure no one else could. My jaw dropped when I heard this, because it provided a legal basis to immediately invalidate each one of the applications. In addition, had anyone followed this defensive "legal advice," their trademark filings would have been wasted money and considered invalid and void ab initio, since U.S. trademark law requires that an applicant must have a bona fide intention to use the mark on each and every good and service listed in the application.

Back to Godin on Trademark*, and even more recently, a couple of months ago Seth Godin wrote about how to protect your ideas in the digital age:

One way is to misuse trademark law. With the help of search engines, greedy lawyers who charge by the letter are busy sending claim letters to anyone who even comes close to using a word or phrase they believe their client 'owns'. News flash: trademark law is designed to make it clear who makes a good or a service. It's a mark we put on something we create to indicate the source of the thing, not the inventor of a word or even a symbol.

While there are certainly some greedy trademark lawyers in the world, and some that overreach on behalf of their client brand owners, even honorable and ethical trademark attorneys worth their hourly rate know that federal protection against dilution for truly famous marks was added to U.S. trademark law about fifteen years ago. At least for marks satisfying the difficult fame standard, these kinds of trademarks come darn close to owning the brand name in gross, that is, in connection with any goods or services.

For the garden variety and non-famous trademark, the scope of rights is defined by whether or not there is a Likelihood of Confusion.

With respect to what trademark law was designed for, and while I don't consider this to be a news flash any longer, well prior to dilution protection being added, U.S. trademark law was amended to make clear that much more than confusion as to source is covered. All the way back in 1962 the Lanham Trademark Act was amended by striking language requiring confusion, mistake or deception of "purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods and services." Moreover, a much broader scope of confusion protection was codified in 1989 in Lanham Act Section 43(a), which protects against trademark likelihood of confusion not only as to source, but as to affiliation, connection, sponsorship, association, and/or approval. This additional scope of trademark protection makes perfect sense given the current commercial realities of trademark licensing, franchises, co-branding, affiliate marketing, and OEM relationships.

I'm not saying Seth Godin's opinions about trademarks are Out of Bounds, I'm simply saying some of them are out of date.

With a little luck, and assuming I can get in enough time in front of my Stuart Smalley mirror between now and next week, I'll explore another misconception or misgiving it appears Mr. Godin has about the registration of trademarks:

Some lawyers will get all excited and encourage (demand!) that you register your trademark. This involves paying a bunch of money, filing a bunch of forms and earning an ® after your name instead of the ™. While the ® does give you some benefits by the time you get to court, it doesn't actually increase the value of your trademark. And you can wait. So, when you come up with a great name, just ™ it.

So, stay tuned.

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Trademark Specimens of Use: A "Necessarily Subjective" Standard

John Welch, over at the TTABlog, reported on a recent trademark specimen of use case (pdf here); one near and dear to my heart, since I represented the Applicant seeking to register the composite word-only mark DELI EXPRESS SAN LUIS for sweet rolls. At issue in the case was whether the product label specimen (appearing below) shows use of the DELI EXPRESS SAN LUIS word-only mark as set forth in the standard character drawing of the trademark application:

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), in what it admitted to be a "necessarily subjective" analysis, examined the product label specimen -- and on that basis alone -- concluded it does not show use of the claimed DELI EXPRESS SAN LUIS mark:

Here, we agree with the examining attorney that the specimen depicts the two literal portions DELI EXPRESS and SAN LUIS in such a manner that consumers would not perceive them as constituting a single composite mark. First, the DELI EXPRESS portion is not only in a different font but is contained within a yellow-background, and then a larger red background, separated from the remainder of the packaging design by a black bar outlining the top left corner of the package. The other literal portion, SAN LUIS, is outside of that border area and is further separated by a fanciful triangle design and placed upon a green background. The term CONCHA appears below these two elements in a lighter green box. Taken together, we find that the impression left by this specimen is that the two elements, DELI EXPRESS and SAN LUIS, are two separate trademarks rather than the single mark shown on the drawing page (emphasis added).

I respectfully submit that these kinds of determinations -- especially since they are admittedly and "necessarily subjective" -- are not binary, either-or propositions. For example, it is entirely possible for a single specimen to show two trademarks that function as separate individual trademarks and also function together in the same specimen as a unitary word-only composite mark (see third-party registration examples below the jump).

Here, it seems to me, that the specimen in question shows multiple word-only marks (among others too, when designs and stylization is considered), including DELI EXPRESS, SAN LUIS, and the composite of those words, DELI EXPRESS SAN LUIS. Indeed, if a consumer were shown the product label and asked what brand of concha or sweet roll this is, it would be entirely reasonable and appropriate to answer: DELI EXPRESS SAN LUIS. If so, how can it be that the specimen does not show use of the claimed mark?

Given that the drawing shows the mark sought to be registered by applicant (TMEP 807; 37 CFR 2.52), given that applicants enjoy some latitude in choosing the mark to register and include in the drawing (TMEP 807.12(d)), given that the main purpose of the drawing is to provide notice of the nature of the mark sought to be registered (TMEP 807), given that the mark shown in a standard character word-only drawing need not appear on the specimen in the same font, style, size, or color (TMEP 807.03(e)), given that the USPTO actually encourages applicants to use standard character drawings (TMEP 807.04(b)), given that a standard character drawing is a quick and efficient way of showing the essence of a verbal mark (TMEP 807.04(b)), and given the "necessarily subjective" nature of the determination, I submit that the appropriate test for determining whether the specimen shows use of the verbal, word-only mark claimed in the standard character drawing, is whether it would be reasonable for consumers to request applicant's product by the claimed trademark, given what actually appears on the specimen.

In other words, how might consumers request applicant's sweet roll product? Again, I submit it is entirely reasonable that consumers who have seen the product label would request the product by asking for a "DELI EXPRESS SAN LUIS concha or sweet roll." Now, while they might also request a "DELI EXPRESS" concha or sweet roll, or perhaps a SAN LUIS concha or sweet roll, the most complete, accurate, and precise way to request the product would be to ask for a "DELI EXPRESS SAN LUIS" brand concha or sweet roll, and also thereby treat the words as a unitary composite mark, because:

  1. The DELI EXPRESS house brand (and primary brand) and the SAN LUIS secondary or sub-brand are the only brands and word-marks on the entire label;
  2. They appear proximate to one another, side-by-side on the same horizontal plane, at the top of the label, for easy, conventional reading from left to right;
  3. They form the dominant portion of the label since the design elements can't be spoken;
  4. The DELI EXPRESS phrase appears in solid black lettering on a yellow-background, and the SAN LUIS phrase has a black-outlined border and it stems from a triangle design element matching the same yellow-background carrying the DELI EXPRESS phrase;
  5. There is no requirement to include generic words as part of the claimed mark, i.e., concha or sweet roll;
  6. Consumers familiar with applicant's products are accustomed to similar label formats where the DELI EXPRESS house brand is proximately positioned with other sub-brands like SUPER MEGA, SNACKERS, COFFEES OF THE WORLD, and SUB SELECTS, to form federally-registered word-only standard character trademarks: DELI EXPRESS SUPER MEGA, DELI EXPRESS SNACKERS, DELI EXPRESS COFFEES OF THE WORLD, and DELI EXPRESS SUB SELECTS; and
  7. Consumers of packaged food products have been conditioned to perceive house marks and secondary marks as not only having separate trademark significance from each other, but also significance together, in the same specimen, even when different colors, styles and fonts may be used for each or portions of each, and even when other matter or wording may appear between them(see third-party registration evidence below the jump).

Unfortunately, the Board did not acknowledge or address the third-party registration evidence submitted along with the specimens of use previously accepted by the USPTO for the same third-party registrations. More on that later . . . .

In the meantime, given the Board's rationale for ruling that the above product label specimen does not show use of the DELI EXPRESS SAN LUIS mark, can you reconcile that "necessarily subjective" decision with any of these standard character word-only federally-registered trademarks and their supporting specimens? Would it be reasonable for consumers, seeing these specimens, to request the goods using the federally-registered standard character word-only marks highlighted below?

PEPPERIDGE FARM SIMPLY DELICIOUS:                  KELLOGG'S SMORZ:

              

 HOT POCKETS TOASTER MELTS:

 

HEINZ EASY SQUEEZE:

Given that other admittedly "subjective" trademark registration determinations favor applicant's in close cases (e.g., scandalous and immoral determinations under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, and merely descriptive/suggestive determinations under Section 2(e) of the Lanham Act), whereby the marks are published for opposition, does it not make sense to do the same when deciding a close case of whether a specimen shows use of the mark claimed in the drawing?

False Advertising Claims on the Rise

There was a very interesting article in the New York Times this weekend worth reading - Best Soup Ever?  Suits Over Ads Now Seek Proof.

The article addresses several recent issues raised by companies against competitors over statements or claims being made in advertisements.  Specifically, companies are challenging the truth or implied truth in competitive ads in an attempt to get the ad withdrawn or changed.

Apparently, the number of complaints over advertisements with the National Advertising Division, as well as the number of false advertising lawsuits (under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act) are up significantly.  Some interesting disputes from the article include:  

  • AT&T sued Verizon Wireless over an ad chart, claiming it falsely implied that AT&T had no cell phone coverage in the white area (rather than no 3G coverage):

The lawsuit attacks use of the chart in several commercials.  One great example, is Verizon's Island of Misfit Toys commercial.  In this holiday commercial, out-of-date toys have been banished to an island where Verizon sends one of AT&T’s new phones, due to its allegedly inadequate coverage.  On a related note, the National Advertising Division recently recommended that Sprint discontinue its use of the claim "Most Dependable 3G Network" due to a lack of sufficient support for the claim. 

  • Pantene attacked Dove’s claims that its conditioner repairs hair better.  According to the Times, Dove defended its claims with a market study and an expert to defend its use of “wet combing” versus “dry combing” technique.   Based upon a quick review of a few blogs, these two companies are in direct competition over solving the frizzies (for examples, see here and here). 

The Times article suggested defending such claims sometimes requires “delving into the minutiae” and raises the question of whether most consumers actually believe and/or rely on statements such as “no other dog food stacks up” or a hair care product that can really “repair hair better.”  Regardless, it is a great article for anyone interesting in marketing. 

Purple People Eater Jim Marshall & Friends Take on the NFL

Viking fans will recall the famous Purple People Eaters from the late 1960s through the late 1970s. The nickname arose for the defensive line of the Vikings from their purple jerseys and the popular Sheb Wooley song bearing that name. Although they went to four Super Bowls (unfortunately, not taking home a Super Bowl ring), the Purple People Eaters did not receive the astronomical, multi-million dollar, contracts received by the Pro Bowl players today. Accordingly, the retired players rely upon the use of their names, images, and likenesses on paraphernalia, sports bars, and other businesses to make money.

 

To protect their valuable trademarks in their names, images and likenesses, Purple People Eater Jim Marshall, along with five other retired National Football League (“NFL”) players, filed a class action lawsuit against the NFL to recover for their injuries as a result of the NFL’s unauthorized use of their identities to promote the NFL, sell NFL-related products and otherwise generate revenue for the NFL.  They have brought claims for false endorsement under the Lanham Act and various state law claims. The lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota.

Their Amended Complaint alleges that “by commercializing the names, images and likenesses of its players, both active and retired, the NFL has become one of the largest entertainment conglomerates on the planet, raking in an estimated $6.9 billion in 2008 alone.” In contrast, the “now-retired NFL players, as a group, suffer severe physical maladies and disabilities as a result of the sacrifices they made to make the NFL what it is today.”  One example identified in the Amended Complaint was that safety Toby Wright sought to use his name, likeness and identity as an NFL player to promote two businesses, one a sports bar and the other a training facility. In response, the NFL informed him that he would have to pay the NFL $100,000 to use his own identity. Because he did not have the funds, the safety was effectively “blocked” from using his own identity. 

Only time will tell if Minnesota Supreme Court Justice Alan Page, who is also a Purple People Eater, will join the class action and whether the Purple People Eater Jim Marshall and the other retired players can beat the NFL off the football field.

What Does "Trademarked" Mean to You?

 

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More than a few trademark types cringe when their clients or others say things like "let's trademark it," "they didn't trademark their logo," or "we don't want to trademark this name," and, when they ask questions like "is it trademarked?" or "is that trademarked software?" or "did we ever trademark our logo?" or "should we be trademarking this packaging?"

Indeed, some have written: “'Trademark' is not a verb. There is no such thing as 'trademarking' a word or phrase." Similar views are expressed here, here, and here.

Perhaps any cringing may result from the fact that the Lanham Act -- the federal trademark statute -- defines the word "trademark" as a noun, not a verb or adjective:

The term "trademark" includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof --

(1) used by a person, or

(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register established by this chapter,

to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.

Section 45 of Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1127.

Turns out though, the words "trademark," "trademarked," and "trademarking," are recognized words with established verb meanings that have formed part of the English language: "(1) To label (a product) with proprietary identification; and (2) to register (something) as a trademark." Moreover, the word "trademarked" has an established adjective meaning too: "labeled with proprietary (and legally registered) identification guaranteeing exclusive use; 'trademarked goods'".

From my perspective, there is no need for cringing or even correction, just further inquiry into how the words "trademark," "trademarked," and "trademarking" are being used.

Given the various definitions for these words, the speaker might mean labeling a product or advertising material, utilizing or marking such materials with the appropriate trademark notice or symbol, registering a trademark or service mark, or perhaps, all of the above. Since the described actions (labeling and registering) are quite distinct, it becomes important to seek clarity on the speaker's intended meaning.

For example, when referring to labeling with proprietary notices, the TM symbol does not require any registration for its proper use, and its use does not even imply registration has been sought or achieved. It simply communicates that the owner of the trademark in question views the claimed mark as proprietary. Likewise, when the SM symbol is used, no registration is required, and none is implied by its use, it simply means the claimed service mark is intended by the owner to be proprietary.

On the other hand, federal registration with the United States Trademark Office is a requirement before one can use the above-depicted "R within the Circle" symbol in the U.S., and it means that the mark in question (either a trademark for goods, or a service mark for services) actually has been federally-registered -- having a pending registration application is not enough, the actual Certificate of Registration must have issued for the use to be proper and lawful.

Keep in mind, that the word "trademark" can have meaning either a noun or verb, should not be confused with our previous discussion of whether verbing trademarks and brands is a good idea: "Just so you know, in general, the law views brand names and trademarks as adjectives, not nouns or verbs, so kudos to Nancy Friedman of Fritinancy to recognize this important point." [For my previous Just Verb It? Series, see: Part I, Part II, and Part III].

Medline Industries, Inc. v. 3M Company (False Advertising Complaint Attached)

[Item]: Sterillium Surgical Hand Scrub, 1000mL [Additional Info]: STERILLIUM SURGICAL HAND SCRUB, WATERLESS, SCRUBLESS,, COMPARE TO AVAGARD AND TRISEPTIN. STERILIUM IS NON-STICKY, DRIES FASTER AND PROTECTS HANDS. VERY COMPETITIVE. BEST SELLER IN EUROPEv.               3m Avagard Surgical Scrub 16 Oz

                        (Medline Sterillium Rub)                                          (3M Avagard Surgical Scrub)

In a very recent false advertising lawsuit, Medline Industries is all lathered up, alleging that 3M Company is playing dirty in the surgical hand antiseptic marketplace by making false and misleading statements in advertising about 3M's Avagard brand surgical scrub and Medline's competing Sterillium Rub brand surgical hand antiseptic.

Here is a copy of the complaint filed in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. As you will see, Medline alleges that 3M has made the following false and/or misleading statements of fact in advertising, in violation of Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act:

  1. Sterillium Rub lacks approvals and/or benefits that it should have;
  2. Sterillium Rub is of a lesser standard, quality, or grade than what it is;
  3. Sterillium Rub does not meet FDA scrub test criteria;
  4. Sterillium Rub does not meet AORN recommendations;
  5. Sterillium Rub does not meet persistency requirements of the FDA;
  6. Sterillium Rub cannot meet FDA criteria for persistency or cumulative activity; and
  7. Avagard is the only waterless, brushless hand antiseptic that meets FDA persistency requirements. 

Paragraph 31 of Medline's false advertising complaint appears to be the most personally and potentially infectious:

During deposition testimony given in the related litigation styled GoJo Industries, Inc. v. 3M Company, United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, Case No. 5:09-cv-1251-DDD, [the] Regulatory Affairs Manager in the Infection Prevention Division of 3M, admitted that statements contained in the marketing literature disseminated by 3M in which 3M compares Avagard to other surgical antiseptic hand scrub products, including Sterillium Rub, misrepresented the FDA scrub test criteria for surgical antiseptic hand scrubs. [She] confirmed this deposition testimony in her testimony before the Court at the preliminary injunction hearing during which the Court characterized her efforts to explain this testimony away as not at all persuasive (citations omitted).

Not only has Medline sued 3M for this alleged unlawful conduct, but it also has taken its claims directly to health care professionals and the surgical hand antiseptic marketplace, commencing a comparative advertising campaign of its own. Presumably, 3M will be closely scrubbing each of the literal and implied claims set forth in this advertising brochure distributed by Medline and BODE Chemie GmbH & Co.

So, stay tuned for developments concerning this interesting federal false advertising case.

Hopefully, we'll eventually be able to learn who comes to court with clean hands. 

Fair Use of the Google Name, Logo, and Distinctive Color Combination?

This unsolicited e-mail communication from the Caribbean Island of Nevis got trapped in our spam filter, but I thought I'd remove the link and bring it out under a short leash for some legal training and discussion:

Google Works

Trademark fair use, you ask?

My answer: No. You wonder, why?

I previously blogged about the trademark nominative fair use defense:

Some advertisers, on the other hand, think that nominative fair use will protect them in using just about anything they want to use in an ad. The nominative fair use defense is actually not as broad in scope as some might think, so now might be a good time to recite the necessary elements of a successful nominative fair use defense:

(1) The product cannot be readily identified without using the trademark;

(2) Only so much of the trademark is used as is necessary for the identification; and

(3) No sponsorship or endorsement of the trademark owner is suggested by the use.

Unauthorized use of the Google script and distinctive color combination cannot satisfy elements (2) and (3) of the nominative fair use defense. Too much has been taken (more than the word itself) and what has been taken (logo and style unique to Google) suggests a sponsorship or endorsement, notwithstanding the barely visible and microscopic disclaimer on the bottom of the website the ad would take you to, were you to "Click Here Now," as the ad requests.

What about naming the product "Google Fortune kit"?

Section 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act, a/k/a the statutory classic or descriptive fair use trademark defense, does not apply unless the use is "otherwise than as a mark," and the term used is "descriptive of" the accused's goods or services, and it is "used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services" (emphasis added) of the one making the unauthorized use.

Naming the product "Google Fortune" fails the classic or descriptive fair use defense because, at a minimum, putting aside questions of good faith for now, the name "Google Fortune" is "used as a mark," and it doesn't "only" describe the offered kit, it also names it and indicates source.

Now, having had the benefit of analyzing the spam e-mail ad with respect to unauthorized use of the Google name, logo, and color combination, how would you analyze the above use of FORTUNE from both trademark fair use defense perspectives?

New York Court Provides No Assistance To "The Little Blue Box" Company

I, like most women, want a present in a little blue box from Tiffany & Company (a/k/a Tiffany & Co.) This is not just because the company bears my name (I only wish I were an owner of the company), but because Tiffany & Co.’s exquisite jewelry is associated with the fabulous blue box.  Tiffany & Co. has been around for over 170 years. The mystique of Tiffany & Co. was enhanced by the movie “Breakfast at Tiffany’s” starring the beloved Audrey Hepburn. To protect this long-established brand and trademark that epitomizes luxury and attentive customer service, Tiffany & Co. took to the courts to obtain protection from Internet sales of counterfeits.  

eBay has become a hotbed for counterfeit sales of many high-end products. To assess the impact of this practice, Tiffany & Co. embarked on two buying programs where it bought products that had been represented to be authentic Tiffany & Co. merchandise on eBay. The overwhelming majority of these purchases, as much as seventy-five percent, were fakes. 

To combat this trademark infringement and dilution, Tiffany & Co. sued eBay in 2004 alleging that eBay had facilitated and allowed these fake or counterfeit items to be sold on its website (bringing six causes of action, including various trademark infringement, dilution and false advertising claims under the Lanham Act). Last month, a New York District Court found that Tiffany & Co.—not eBay—was responsible for protecting its brand and trademark on the auction site. In other words, eBay is not responsible for keeping its users from selling fake jewelry with the Tiffany & Co. name. eBay is only required to take appropriate action when it receives notice of the infringement, presumably from Tiffany & Co. Not surprisingly, Tiffany & Co. has appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 

Does this decision ignore an important tenet of the Lanham Act—that it is supposed to protect consumers and trademark owners? Should eBay and other sites such as Amazon.com have independent obligations not to contribute to trademark infringement (i.e., policing their websites)? 

Several other high-end companies have sued eBay in Europe and have fared much better than Tiffany & Co. did in the United States.   A French judge ordered eBay to pay 40 million euros (in light of the current low value of the United States dollar, this would translate to $63.2 million) to LVMH Moёt Hennessy Louis Vuitton over charges of selling fakes. Similarly, the German courts held that eBay must employ preventative measures against the sale of fake Rolex watches.  Unless the Second Circuit overturns the New York District Court’s decision, consumers and trademark owners will receive more protection in Europe than in the United States. Should American courts be more friendly to trademark owners?

Goodbye, Mr. Hughes

This past Thursday, John Hughes—the mind that created every slumber party-worthy movie of my youth—passed away from a heart attack. Whenever I hear John Hughes’ name, my mind, taking some sort of odd word-association trip, automatically shifts to “The Breakfast Club,” which then makes me think of the Simple Minds song “Don’t You Forget About Me” (the anthem of the movie), which then makes me think of the lead singer of Simple Minds, whose name I can’t remember but who I’m convinced has red hair…

In short, the consumer associations I have with John Hughes—and with the film “The Breakfast Club” specifically—are particularly strong, meaningful and positive. I would venture to say that, given the sheer number of pages devoted to quotes from John Hughes’ movies, I’m not alone in these associations. At the heart of trademark protection is the goal of protecting consumer associations—or “goodwill”—which is so precious to businesses building their brands. While a movie title such as “The Breakfast Club” is not technically a brand under which John Hughes technically sold goods and services, that movie, along with numerous others in his repertoire, collectively showcase John Hughes’ “brand” of narrative, wit, juvenile humor, and outlook on Gen-X adolescence. 

And yet, titles of works such as “The Breakfast Club” are not protected by trademark law. The Lanham Act prohibits the registration of a title, or portion of a title, or a single creative work, because, according to the Lanham Act, a single title can’t function as a source-identifier.   See 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1052 and 1127. However, a title used in a series, such as HARRY POTTER, is considered capable of acting as a source-identifier and may therefore achieve a trademark registration.

Notably, the United States Patent and Trademark Office lists 15 records for THE BREAKFAST CLUB, a few of which are registered in connection with entertainment services, and all of which were filed after “The Breakfast Club” premiered in 1985. Rightfully or wrongfully, and though the Trademark Office may never recognize it, to at least this fan, the words “The Breakfast Club” will always identify one source and one source only—John Hughes.

How Hot Will This Saucy Trademark Chip Fight Be? Blazin' Hot? Now, That's Hot!

There is no question that attempting to own "hot" or versions of "hot" appears to have great value and importance in the marketing world. So, how many original, unique, and memorable ways are there to communicate spicy "hot" anyway?

As to memorable, perhaps painfully memorable, Paris Hilton apparently sells designer clothes under her "That's Hot" brand, and judging from her pending federal trademark filings, she still has an intention of expanding her "That's Hot" brand to cell phones and alcoholic beverages, among other items, but apparently not buffalo chicken wing sauce or potato chips, thankfully.

Otherwise, it really might distract from a recent pair of trademark food fights in Minneapolis, both involving chips claiming to be "hot" too. You may recall the "Red Hot" Chip Fight between Barrel O'Fun and Old Vienna discussed here, that was quickly bagged here.

So, here are the current contenders in the most recent "Blazin' Hot" trademark food fight:

   Vs.   buffalowings

A copy of the Buffalo Wild Wings trademark infringement complaint against P&G and Pringles is here.

The most interesting aspect of the complaint, from a trademark strategy perspective, is the fact that Buffalo Wild Wings did not bring a claim for infringement of a federally-registered trademark (Section 32 of the Lanham Act). Instead, it only relies on Section 43 of the Lanham Act (designed to protect unregistered trademarks) and a pair of Minnesota state law causes of action, even though it refers to owning some federal trademark and service mark registrations for and containing the term BLAZIN'. Perhaps Buffalo Wild Wings is attempting to insulate them from attack or challenge by P&G, since none is five years old yet or incontestable. Stay tuned to learn whether P&G turns up the heat on this dispute and counterclaims for cancellation anyway.

Now, as to the "original and unique" point raised above, it is worth asking, who else appears to have a stake in "Blazin" hot trademarks for food products? Uh, let's just say, more than a few . . . .

Sara Lee owns a federal registration for BLAZIN' HOT covering processed meats and meat snacks, and sandwiches, namely sausage biscuits;

Frito-Lay owns a federal registration for BLAZIN' BUFFALO & RANCH covering tortilla chips;

Pilgrim's Pride owns a federal registration for BLAZIN' WINGS covering chicken wings;

Jardine's owns a federal registration for BLAZIN' SADDLE covering hot (spicy) salsa;

International Market Brands owns a federal registration for BLAZIN RED covering red hot sauces;

Meijer owns a federal registration for MEIJER BLAZIN' BBQ SAUCE covering barbecue sauce;

Hot Stuff Foods owns a federal registration for BLAZIN' covering dry spice mix;

Jarden owns a federal registration for BLAZIN' ONION covering a seasoning kit;

Oasis Foods owns a federal registration for GRILL BLAZIN' covering barbecue sauce; and

Branding Iron Foods owns a federal registration for E.Z. EARL'S BLAZIN-HOT covering hot sauce.

So, how is it that in the prayer for relief in the complaint, Buffalo Wild Wings asks the court to enjoin P&G "from using the term BLAZIN' with the words 'buffalo,' 'wing,' or 'sauce'?

OK, I'm not THINKIN' ARBY'S, but I AM THINKIN' the scope of claimed rights in BLAZIN' is going to be an issue in this case.