Last Friday, the Supreme Court decided it will hear the Brunetti case, and take a closer look at Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, the portion forbidding federal registration of trademarks having matter that is scandalous or immoral.

So, it appears my big prediction for 2019 is pointing in the affirmative direction:

“In terms of my big trademark prediction for 2019, it will be revealed whether the scandalous bar to federal registration is invalidated, whether or not the Supreme Court agrees to hear Brunetti.”

Now that the Court has decided to review Brunetti, it will be the one to decide whether the “scandalous” and “immoral” bars to registration violate the First Amendment, not the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

So, perhaps Chief Justice John Roberts was foreshadowing a review of Brunetti, when he was speaking in Minneapolis, and said: “Obviously, if any court finds an Act of Congress unconstitutional, we will take it . . . .

To piggyback on what I wrote back in October:

“There are plenty of good reasons for the Court to decide the constitutionality of the “scandalous” and “immoral” language, separate and apart from the disparagement language found to violate the First Amendment in Tam (here, here, here, here, here, and here).”

“If the Court does hear Brunetti, let’s hope Section 7 of the Lanham Act — the provision expressly noting that federal registrations are issued ‘in the name of the United States of America‘ — won’t be some uninteresting and ignored ‘nuance’ of trademark law to the justices.”

You may recall, I previously said this about the Federal Circuit’s overreach in Brunetti:

“What is striking about the CAFC ruling is its breadth. It isn’t guided by the Supreme Court’s Tam decision — requiring viewpoint discrimination — as the Tam Court found with disparagement.”

“The CAFC did not decide whether the ‘scandalous and immoral’ clause constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination, instead it seized on mere content as lower hanging fruit for invalidation.”

“The problem with focusing on content alone is that it proves too much. Trademarks, by definition, are made up of content, and many other provisions of federal law limit the right to register based on content, so, if this analysis holds, what additional previously-thought-well-settled provisions of federal trademark law will fall? Importantly, some even allow for injunctive relief: tarnishment.”

I’m thinking the Court will decide that the Federal Circuit went too far in Brunetti, and it will find a way to retain the “scandalous” bar to federal registration, though I’m doubting the “immoral” bar will survive, so stay tuned.

What are your predictions dear readers?

This is quite a collection of art pieces, inspired by some pretty recognizable candy bar brands:

The fine print reads: “Each handmade . . . sculpture is a real working whistle!” Parodies, anyone?

Here’s a question, does the functionality of these pieces make them any less expressive as art, any more likely to be confused, any more likely to dilute, any less First Amendment worthy?

Trademarks consisting of or comprising “scandalous or immoral” matter still won’t be granted federal registration “in the name of the United States of America,” at least for the time being.

Immediately on the heels of the International Trademark Association’s 140th Annual Meeting in Seattle, and our well-received panel discussion concerning Trademarks and Free Speech, the United States Patent and Trademark Office announced it will continue to hold on to and suspend trademark applications containing scandalous or immoral matter, until further notice.

The Trademark Office is waiting to see whether the federal government will appeal the Brunetti decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. What I would give to be a fly on the wall in those discussions.

As you may recall, a three-member panel of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), ruled last December that the “scandalous or immoral” statutory bar to registration violates a trademark applicant’s Free Speech, overturning a part of trademark law in existence since 1905.

Since the federal government’s request that the entire CAFC reconsider the three-member panel decision Brunetti was denied in April, the government now has until July 11 to seek Supreme Court review or ask for more time to decide, stay tuned. Learned John Welch predicts no appeal.

During our INTA panel discussion, I predicted the government will seek review of Brunetti by the U.S. Supreme Court. I also predicted the Supreme Court will pass on the request, stay tuned.

Even if it might be tempting to believe that — in our present culture — anything goes and nothing can rise to the level of scandalousness any longer, so why bother trying to salvage a statutory relic from more than 100 years ago, I’m thinking the federal government won’t throw in the towel yet.

As we’ve written before, the Brunetti decision, didn’t anchor itself to the viewpoint discriminatory requirement from the Supreme Court in Tam, instead focusing on mere content discrimination to justify invalidation of a more than a century old part of federal trademark law.

This much easier test for invalidation puts at risk many other portions of federal trademark law, so I’m thinking the federal government can’t let the mere content discriminatory requirement of Brunetti stand without at least trying for Supreme Court review for further direction and guidance.

It’s also hard to believe the federal government is truly ready to have the USPTO knowingly begin to federally register obscene, profane, and sexually explicit matter as trademarks, “in the name of the United States of America,” for the first time in history. What’s your prediction?

UPDATE: Susan Decker of Bloomberg interviewed and shares quotes yours truly on the subject, here.

Yesterday in Seattle — where nearly 11,000, sleepless, brand protection, trademark, and IP professionals from 150 countries have registered and converged for INTA’s 140th Annual Meeting — yours truly had the distinct pleasure of sharing some thoughts on the intersection between federal trademark registration and Free Speech. Here are some before, during and after pics:

Before:

 

During:

 

 

After:

Steve Baird, Amanda Blackhorse, Joel MacMull, Simon Tam
Professor Lisa Ramsey, Steve Baird, and Professor Christine Haight Farley whispering in Steve’s ear

Highlights:

Amanda Blackhorse:

Message to Daniel Snyder: “You cannot force honor on someone.”

Steve Baird:

“Federal trademark registration is a giant exception to Free Speech.”

Other messages drawn from here, here, here, here, and here.

Simon Tam:

Interpreting USPTO: “They said we were too Asian!”

Joel MacMull:

The Tam case never should have been decided on Constitutional grounds!

Great questions from the engaged crowd, wish there had been much more time!

What were your highlights from the panel discussion?

UPDATE: Simon Tam, writing about Paper Justice, here.

— Jessica Gutierrez Alm, Attorney

Simon Tam wasn’t the only one barred by the Lanham Act from reclaiming a historically derogatory term.

Dykes on Bikes is a nonprofit lesbian motorcycle organization.  According to their website, the group’s mission is to “support philanthropic endeavors in the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and women’s communities, and to reach out to empower a community of diverse women through rides, charity events, Pride events, and education.”  In 2015, Dykes on Bikes tried to register their logo as a service mark for entertainment.  The application was put on hold pending the outcome of Matal v. Tam, as the Supreme Court considered whether Simon Tam could register his band name—The Slants.  In view of the Court’s landmark decision holding the disparagement provision of the Lanham Act unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, Dykes on Bikes will move forward with its trademark application as well.

It was in 2003 when Dykes on Bikes first sought to register the name of their organization as a service mark for education and entertainment services.  Registration was refused on the basis that the mark was disparaging to lesbians.  The organization appealed to the TTAB, arguing that the word “dyke” had become a positive term and a symbol of pride and empowerment.  Dykes on Bikes won their appeal before the TTAB.  But when the mark was published for opposition, an individual named Michael McDermott filed an opposition claiming the mark was disparaging to men.  Ultimately, McDermott’s opposition was dismissed for lack of standing.  In particular, McDermott failed to show either (1) he possesses a trait or characteristic implicated by the proposed mark; or (2) others share the same belief of harm from the proposed mark.  The TTAB dismissed McDermott’s opposition and the Federal Circuit affirmed.  DIKES ON BIKES was successfully registered in 2007.

Because they had already won the disparagement battle for their first mark, Dykes on Bikes was surprised to face another disparagement refusal for a second mark.  In 2015, the group sought to register their logo as a service mark.  They sought review by the TTAB, and the case was put on hold pending the outcome of Matal v. Tam.  Dykes on Bikes also filed an amicus brief in the Tam case, arguing in favor of Tam’s position.  After the Supreme Court held in Tam that “the disparagement clause violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment,” the DYKES ON BIKES W M C logo was approved for publication.

Dykes on Bikes and The Slants had similar goals.  As Dykes on Bikes described in their amicus brief, both groups “have chosen to reclaim self-referential terms as trademarks for the benefit of the groups those terms refer to.”  They also drew a distinction with respect to a certain NFL team name: “the Washington Redskins have chosen a term that is unrelated to the people who identify as members of the football team and is commonly understood to be a slur which members of the identified group have not reclaimed.  Whatever the constitutionality of the PTO’s treatment of the Redskins mark, the team’s use of that name is immoral and Dykes on Bikes encourages the Washington Redskins to give up their trademarked name as a matter of respect and decency.”

While the Tam decision may have opened the proverbial flood gates of offensive trademark applications, it also allows for these positive trademark uses in reclaiming derogatory terms.

AM General, manufacturer of Humvee military vehicles, has sued Activision Blizzard for trademark infringement, based on the use of the “Humvee” and “HMMWV” marks for the virtual military vehicles displayed in Activision’s Call of Duty video games. See the complaint here, filed last week in the Southern District of New York. For those of you who are not avid video-gamers, Call of Duty is a military-themed first-person shooter game–and it’s one of the best-selling games in the world, selling more than 250 million copies since 2003.

AM General owns federal trademark registrations for the marks HUMVEE (Reg. No. 1697530) and HMMWV (Reg. No. 3026594), for use in connection with the military trucks that the company manufactures. (“HMMWV” is an acronym referring to High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle.)

This dispute raises issues similar to those I’ve discussed in recent posts (such as here) regarding the gap between trademark use in the real-world, versus trademark use in the virtual realm, such as in video games, which involve depictions of arguably related goods or services. Here, it is questionable whether consumers would be confused as to source. There is no indication that AM General sells video games, or that Activision sells military vehicles.

For example, in E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008), the court held that consumer confusion was unlikely based on a video game’s reference to the mark “Play Pen,” referring to a real-world strip club, because: “The San Andreas Game is not complementary to the Play Pen; video games and strip clubs do not go together ….  Nothing indicates that the buying public would reasonably have believed that ESS produced the video game or, for that matter, that Rockstar operated a strip club.”

Nevertheless, confusion as to source isn’t the only actionable type of confusion–there’s an argument that consumers could be confused as to whether there is an affiliation, sponsorship, or approval between Activision and AM General as to the Call of Duty video games and the references to the HUMVEE and HMMWV marks, such as a licensing deal. Such an argument is reinforced by AM General’s allegations in the complaint that it has licensed the use of its HUMVEE mark in several other video games.

However, Activision may also have several defenses, including a nominative fair-use defense. The defense of nominative fair-use may apply where a defendant uses a mark solely to describe and refer to the plaintiff’s product, but not the defendant’s product, for purposes such as comparison, criticism, or simply a point of reference. Here, it would seem that Activision is using the HUMVEE and HMMWV marks nominatively, to refer to AM General’s military vehicles, rather than any of Activision’s products.

A free-speech defense may also apply for artistic expression under the First Amendment. The Rock Star Videos case, cited above, has relevant discussion of this defense in a similar context. In that case, the court applied the Second Circuit’s “Rogers test,” under which “an artistic work’s use of a trademark that otherwise would violate the Lanham Act is not actionable unless the [use of the mark] has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless [it] explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.” Rock Star Videos, 547 F.3d at 1095 (quoting Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989)). The court held that this defense was established, because the San Andreas video game was an artistic work; the reference to the “Play Pen” mark for a strip club had “at least some artistic relevance” (this is a low threshold–the level of relevance “merely must be above zero”); and the reference did not explicitly mislead consumers as to the source of the work.  Id. at 1099-1101.

Similarly here, Activision could argue that its video game and the references to AM General’s marks are merely artistic expression; that the references to the HUMVEE and HMMWV have at least some non-zero level of artistic relevance; and such references do not explicitly mislead consumers.

It will be interesting to see the defenses raised by Activision and how this dispute ultimately plays out. Activision’s answer to the complaint will be due in a couple weeks. How do you think this case will be resolved? Stay tuned for updates.

 

Over the weekend, the Star Tribune continued the growing drum beat of understandable excitement for Super Bowl LII, as it steadily approaches U.S. Bank Stadium in Minneapolis.

The article also plays the typical NFL-enabling drum beat of caution against local businesses that might see fit to fairly and truthfully reference the Super Bowl in some commercial manner:

“From the NFL’s viewpoint, if businesses use the terms or other trademarks, it could appear like it is an official part of the Super Bowl or its related events, said Dolores DiBella, one of the lead intellectual property attorneys for the NFL.”

Perhaps the NFL would like to live in a world where no business can use the words “Super Bowl” without paying a fee; that isn’t the world we live in, especially given the growing judicial drum beat and emphasis on Free Speech and the First Amendment in the trademark/copyright worlds.

Nowhere in the article is there any acknowledgement that the NFL has long been accused of behaving as a trademark bully and overreaching with its valuable intellectual property rights.

The legal test for trademark infringement (likelihood of confusion) is not shown when a use “could appear like it is an official part of the Super Bowl or its related events,” the mere possibility is simply not enough, the likelihood of confusion must be probable.

Nowhere in the article is there any mention of trademark fair use; classic or nominative fair use. Nowhere is there any mention of Free Speech or the First Amendment. Even, this kind.

And, for those wondering whether the Super Bowl trademark might be famous and deserving of dilution protection, let’s not forget, the future of trademark dilution law is in question.

So, while it is true that not uttering the words “Super Bowl” will help a business play it safe and avoid all the fire and fury of the NFL, for those who are properly advised and have insurance coverage for advertising injury, that would be a very big game worth watching (or playing) too.

Today marks the 25th anniversary of the filing of the petition to cancel the R-Word registrations held by Pro-Football, Inc., the NFL franchise playing near the Nation’s capital.

Indian Country Today has published an interview with Suzan Shown Harjo, lead petitioner in Harjo et al v. Pro-Football, Inc., and organizer of Blackhorse et al v. Pro-Football, Inc.

Thanks to Indian Country Today and Suzan Shown Harjo for sharing this interview. Its documentation of history is so important for anyone who cares where we’ve been as a country and where we’re headed; it is valuable and timeless, powerful and compelling.

I’m so thankful to Suzan for the opportunity to play a small part in this long yet unfinished history, and here is a photo of us together on May 15, 2015, at a conference in Hinckley, Minnesota, during a celebration honoring her lifetime of advocacy for Native peoples:

Suzan’s heretofore and ongoing work is truly remarkable and a testament to who she is, even in the face of ignorant vitriol, and to how many lives she has touched and continues to touch in such a profound, generous, and meaningful way.

As I reflect on the historic petition to cancel we filed together on September 10, 1992, one thing I can’t get out of my mind is the national press conference question I answered from the Washington D.C. press corps, something like “what about the First Amendment?”

As I recall, my response was, something like, the beauty of this cause of action is that the First Amendment is not implicated because removing the federal government’s erroneous approval of the racial slur doesn’t compel the team to change the name, having said that, it is of course our hope that the team does the right thing and pick another name.

Who could have guessed it would take nearly a quarter century to reverse prior court of appeals precedent (McGinley) saying Section 2(a) did not violate Free Speech or the First Amendment, and then to have the Supreme Court agree that refusing federal registration of disparaging matter under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act is viewpoint discrimination and a violation of Free Speech.

Thankfully much awareness has been raised and good has been done over the past quarter century, while the NFL and Washington franchise double down together on their joint investment to retain exclusive rights in a racial slur.

Hopefully with increased awareness raised and the movement and pressure continuing, we won’t have to wait another quarter century for justice and clearer thinking on this issue by the NFL, FEDEX, and other NFL sponsors, if not Daniel Snyder himself.

As I reflect back a quarter century ago, to the day, it was never about banning the team’s Freedom of Speech, it was about removing the federal government’s approval of a racial slur as a federally-registered trademark, and providing team ownership with a financial incentive to reconsider their choice to ignore the obvious, as Suzan has noted:

“We liked the approach of a pocketbook incentive case that did not force a name-change, but counted on the greed of the team owner to drop the name if exclusive federal trademarks were cancelled.”

“The pocketbook approach put things squarely where pro sports differed from educational sports: money. In most name and symbol changes made in educational sports, we had a way of discussing the issues and solutions, because there almost always were educators and officials who genuinely cared about the well-being of the students. In pro sports, even the health and safety issues seemed focused on liability and not on human beings, and some paid fans seemed physically provocative, while others seemed orchestrated online to attack and defame those of us who were challenging the NFL franchise in orderly legal forums.”

“Another reason I liked the pocketbook approach was that it didn’t impede anyone’s free speech. I was at WBAI-FM  in 1973, when the “seven dirty words” case started down the road to the Supreme Court’s 1978 ruling against free speech. The free speech flagship station of the Pacifica network, WBAI aired a cut from Comedian George Carlin’s “Class Clown” album and a listener complained to the Federal Communications Commission that his young son was wrongly exposed to dirty words. George Carlin’s “Seven Words You Can Never Say on Television” was based on an earlier routine by Comedian Lenny Bruce that was an excuse for one of his many arrests and jailings for using dirty words. The upshot of FCC v. Pacifica Foundation was that the federal government can restrict free speech in certain instances, the opposite of the Court’s 2017 ruling in The Slants case against the PTO, which rendered part of the trademark law unconstitutional as violative of the First Amendment. We never thought we were violating the NFL’s freedom of expression by using the same section of the trademark law.”

Ironically, as team owner Daniel Synder freely and proudly admits, the team’s ability and commitment to continue using the name will never change, even in the face of the mountain of evidence demonstrating its offensiveness and meaning as a racial slur, and even in the face of losing on the merits three times (twice at the TTAB, once at the E.D. Va.), or more.

So much for the Supreme Court’s concern that Section 2(a) actually chills Freedom of Speech, because according to Snyder, even after losing on the merits he has reaffirmed: “We will never change the name of the team,” “It’s that simple. NEVER — you can use caps.”

So, in the end, it is about the money, and the NFL clearly has had sufficient funds to defend the indefensible for a quarter century now, so isn’t it time FEDEX and other NFL sponsors step up and get on the right side of this issue, with their money? Let’s all follow the money.

Here’s to you Suzan, be well, Aho.

Over the weekend, IPBiz reported that WWE (World Wrestling Entertainment) has filed an application to register 3:16 as a trademark for clothing items.

A Google search confirms that 3:16 has religious significance as it is a common truncation that signifies one of the most widely quoted verses from the Bible, namely, John 3:16.

Despite other confusing media reports that the WWE has “trademarked” 3:16, IPBiz is correct that an intent to use trademark application was filed by WWE at the end of July.

While I could hazard a guess, technically it is presently uncertain whether WWE intends a religious meaning, at least from the application file, as no specimen of use is of record yet.

Ironically, our firm’s firewall leaves me to hazard a guess on WWE’s intended meaning too.

Yes, our sturdy firewall has deemed anything appearing on the WWE website to be “unsafe or unsuitable” for access, so we may need the kind assistance of our dear readers to assist in our understanding of the meaning intended by the WWE for this claimed mark.

Either way, it will be interesting to follow the USPTO’s examination of this application, given the newly minted Examination Guide 2-17 on “Merely Informational Matter,” which directly targets religious matter, among other matter (citations omitted from below quote):

Some proposed marks comprise direct quotations, passages, or citations from religious texts (e.g., JOHN 3:16 and I AM THE WAY, AND THE TRUTH, AND THE LIFE. NO ONE COMES TO THE FATHER EXCEPT THROUGH ME).  Religious texts are holy books or scriptures, such as the Bible, Quran, Torah, and Diamond Sutra, which the different religions or spiritual movements consider sacred or essential to their religious traditions and beliefs. Such quotations, passages, or citations are often used by the providers of goods/services (and by consumers) as an expression of affiliation with, support for, or endorsement of the ideals or concepts found in the religious texts in which the quotation, passage, or citation originated. Because consumers are accustomed to seeing such wording used in this manner in the marketplace, consumers are unlikely to perceive it as indicating source and instead would perceive the wording as conveying a merely informational message of religious affiliation, endorsement, or support for the messages in the texts.

Where a quotation, passage, or citation from a religious text serves as an indicator of support or affiliation and not of source, such wording fails to function as a mark.  The refusal applies regardless of whether the identified goods/services themselves are religious in nature.  However, the inclusion of religious goods/services further supports this refusal.  The following examples illustrate this point:

  • Mark is comprised, in its entirety, of a direct quotation/passage and/or citation from a religious text (e.g., Allah is the Light of the heavens and the earth The Qur’an, Surah An-Nur 24:35; I AM THE WAY, AND THE TRUTH AND THE LIGHT.  NO ONE COMES TO THE FATHER EXCEPT THROUGH ME; or MATTHEW 19:26).  The entire mark must be refused registration because the matter fails to function as a mark.

  • Mark is comprised, in part, of a direct quotation/passage and/or citation from a religious text and registrable matter (e.g., Hear, O Israel: The Lord is our God; the Lord is one and the image of the Earth being held in a pair of hands; ROMANS 8:28 and an image of a teddy bear).  The direct quotation/passage and/or citation must be disclaimed because they fail to function as marks.

Do you think the WWE will be wrestling with USPTO over the meaning of 3:16 soon?

If so, how might the USPTO explain the issuance of these registrations: 3:16, Studio 3:16, and 3:16 Lure Co?

And, finally, might the newly minted examination guide conflict with the recent Supreme Court decision in Tam, holding that the USPTO’s refusal of federal trademark registration based on viewpoint violates Freedom of Speech?

Looking forward to sharing the podium with Joel MacMull of the Archer firm (counsel for Simon Tam, where our friend Ron Coleman is a partner) to discuss “Trademark Registration and the First Amendment,” on September 28th at the Midwest IP Institute in Minneapolis.

As a drum roll leading up to that discussion, and since there is so much to digest in the recent Supreme Court decision in Tam, I thought I’d do a series of posts on the decision and its implications, beyond what I’ve already written.

In this first installment, my focus will be on critiquing (as a trademark type) the opinion of the Court, that is, the portion of the decision written by Justice Alito, to which all seven of the other Justices agreed (the ninth, Justice Gorsuch, did not participate in the decision).

In a nutshell, my principal problem with the Court’s opinion is that all eight Justices have conflated the federal government’s issuance of a Certificate of Registration with the underlying applied-for trademark. The Court ignored that the meaning of each is distinct.

The meaning of the underlying trademark is one thing, determined by how the relevant public perceives and understands the applied-for mark. As an aside, the Court seemed more interested in Mr. Tam’s intentions in using an admitted racial slur as a trademark.

Yet, the meaning of the Certificate of Registration is quite different. It signifies that the federal government has approved the applied-for trademark for registration and issued a federal registration “in the name of the United States of America.

It would be easier to accept and respect the decision of the Court had it acknowledged and attempted to explain why Congress is powerless under the Commerce Clause to regulate what the USPTO may issue “in the name of the United States of America.”

Perhaps the Court’s conflation in Tam should be no surprise, as a few years ago, the unanimous Supreme Court in B&B Hardware, essentially conflated the right to register a trademark with the right to use the trademark.

Another concerning aspect of the Court’s opinion is how it seriously overstated what was at issue in Tam. It held that in denying federal registration to a mark consisting of a racial slur, the disparagement clause of Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act “violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment” because it “offends a bedrock First Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”

To be clear, the only speech even potentially banned under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act relates to forbidding the use of the federal registration symbol — ® — next to the racial slur, because that symbol may not be used, unless a Certificate of Registration has been issued for the mark in question.

To the extent the ® symbol constitutes speech at all, the symbol ought to be considered government speech (which is outside First Amendment scrutiny), since federal governmental approval is required in order to use it in commerce.

The Court missed the point when it stated the obvious: “Trademarks are private, not government speech.” The better and more relevant question would have asked whether the ® symbol is purely private speech. Seems obvious to me it’s not.

While the underlying trademark has a certain meaning and constitutes private speech, the federal government’s issuance of a Certificate of Registration and allowing the use of the ® symbol to signify this fact, cannot fairly be considered private speech. Instead, by definition, it connotes governmental approval.

On this point, the Court was unconvincing when it cited a 55-year old concurring opinion from the late Federal Circuit Judge Giles Rich for the proposition “it is unlikely that more than a tiny fraction of the public has any idea what federal registration of a trademark means.”

In that case, Judge Rich claimed, at least in 1962: “The purchasing public knows no more about trademark registration than a man walking down the street in a strange city knows about legal title to the land and buildings he passes.”

In my experience, all sorts of folks know that the ® symbol cannot be used without first obtaining approval from the federal government. Goodness, Forbes writes about it, National Law Journal, admitted non-lawyers, and a multitude of others do too, including us.

Friends, what do you think, do the folks understand and appreciate that the ® symbol is special and cannot be used without first obtaining approval from the federal government?