DuetsBlog

Collaborations in Creativity & the Law

Dog Toy Manufacturers Really Like Parodies

Posted in Dilution, Famous Marks, Fashion, Food, Infringement, Law Suits, Mixed Bag of Nuts, Product Packaging, Trademarks

A dog toy display at a local pet store caught my attention recently.

I did a double take on seeing the familiar fonts, coloring, and packaging.  Not long after, I happened to find these at a different pet store.

Once again, the familiar labels, coloring, and bottle designs caught my attention.

While certainly reminiscent of the actual brands, these all appear to be clear examples of parody.  The Chewy Vuiton case is particularly instructive here.  In that case, Louis Vuitton sued dog toy manufacturer Haute Diggity Dog for trademark infringement and dilution over a Louis Vuitton-themed dog toy.

The court held that the dog toy was indeed a successful parody, and Haute Diggity’s use of CHEWY VUITON did not constitute infringement or dilute the Louis Vuitton trademark rights.  In analyzing Haute Diggity’s parody defense, the court defined a parody as a work that (1) references the original/famous brand, (2) but makes clear that the work is not the original/famous brand, and (3) communicates some articulable element of satire, ridicule, joking, or amusement.  While recognizing the similarities between the dog toy and Louis Vuitton’s designer bags, the court also articulated several differences.  For example, the court highlighted that the dog toy is smaller, plush, and inexpensive—clear distinctions over LV purses.  The court characterized the dog toys as “simplified and crude,” rather than the “detailed and distinguished” purses.

While Jose Perro, Dr. Pooper, HeinieSniff’n and the others I recently stumbled on are probably parodies as well, they beg the question of where the parody line falls.  The Chewy Vuiton court made clear that there must be some readily identifiable differences between the original mark and the parodied work.  But how many differences are enough?

Consider the Snif peanut butter jar, for example.  While the words and the items themselves are different, there seems to be some room for suggested association between peanut butter and dog toys.  Peanut butter is frequently used as a dog treat by many owners.  Surely a dog owner might believe Jif peanut butter had entered the dog toy market.

What do you think?  Are all of these clear cases of parody like the Chewy Vuiton toys?

Although perhaps the most important question is: why are there so many dog toy parodies?

It’s Not a Wonderful Trademark Examination

Posted in Articles, Branding, Food, Infringement, Marketing, Trademarks, USPTO

It’s a wonderful life, collaborating with brand owners and marketing teams to advance their goals.

Our work for brand owners also involves a collaboration of sorts with the U.S. Trademark Office.

We work with the USPTO to obtain registrations for our clients and this triggers USPTO obligations.

As such, when examining applications, the USPTO must search its records for conflicting marks.

It also must refuse applications for marks that are confusingly similar to prior registered marks.

Mistakes happen, but sadly, if the USPTO misses a proper refusal, the brand owner holds the bag.

So, when the USPTO doesn’t do its job well, the brand owner is put in a position to spend money.

Several weeks ago, I expressed near certainty that the USPTO would refuse registration of Kevin O’Leary’s (of Shark Tank fame) application to federally register his nicknameMr. Wonderful — given another’s well-established, federally-registered trademark rights in WONDERFUL for nuts:

Surisingly, the USPTO has issued no refusal, and the Mr. Wonderful mark -for nuts- has been approved for publication. If you’re at a loss how that can be, here is the USPTO’s search summary.

As it reveals, the “session duration” lasted 218 seconds; not a single “wonderful” mark was “viewed” during examination, yet hundreds of “mr” trademark records were, maybe even him?

The “mr” portion of the search was narrowed to focus on the nuts class of goods (IC 29), but strangely this wasn’t done for the “wonderful” portion, leading to zero “wonderful” viewed records.

Let’s just call this oversight for what it is, not exactly a wonderful trademark examination by the USPTO — literally and figuratively. The Mr. Wonderful approval — for nuts –looks like clear error.

Were we in Wonderful’s camp, we’d be thinking about a Letter of Protest to have the USPTO issue the likelihood of confusion refusal, because it costs peanuts compared to a full-blown opposition.

Trademark types, would you get crackin’ on a Letter of Protest, were you holding Wonderful’s bag?

Marketing types, how nuts would you be spending a lot more than peanuts, if the USPTO doesn’t acknowledge clear error and issue the refusal, to help make a Notice of Opposition unnecessary.

To the extent you’re in Mr. Wonderful’s camp, how would you approach a registration refusal, knowing that 15 of the 16 live “wonderful” marks at the USPTO for nuts are Wonderful’s marks?

Can a YouTube Video Invalidate a Patent? It’s Certainly Possible

Posted in Articles, Audio, Infringement, Law Suits, Patents, Search Engines, Squirrelly Thoughts, Technology, Television, USPTO

One of the most common defenses to patent infringement is that the asserted patent is invalid. The reasons for invalidity regularly range from lack of utility, to incorrect inventorship, and even to fraud (as I’ve recently written about). Often, the defendant asserts that the patent is invalid for lack of novelty or non-obviousness–pointing to some piece of evidence that the defendant says conclusively shows that the invention was already in the public domain before the plaintiff even applied for the patent. That evidence is called invalidating “prior art.”

Prior art can spell the unexpected demise of an otherwise valid patent, and it comes in many forms. For several decades, published prior art (not to be confused with prior art in the form of prior uses or sales) consisted of already-existing patents (and applications), trade journals, drawings, articles, websites, standards, whitepapers, etc. But Congress expanded the scope of published prior art dramatically in passing the America Invents Act in 2012. Whereas before prior art consisted merely of “printed publications,” post-AIA, prior art also encompasses things that are “otherwise available to the public.”

The larger–and more modern–universe of possible published prior art is easy to imagine. For example, prior art references are no longer limited to traditional publications and documentary evidence. Instead, additional forms of multimedia come into play–which is fitting in today’s multimedia-packed times. Videos, movies, broadcasts, and recordings all now qualify as prior art, so long as they are available to the public.

But despite this expansion, litigants have not yet fully taken advantage of the change. There have been a few recent uses of video as prior art, such as the iconic iPhone keynote speech made by the late Steve Jobs demonstrating a technology described in an Apple patent. Ironically, in commenting on the “bounce-back” effect that was the subject of the patent, Steve Jobs stated, “boy have we patented it.” But Apple failed to patent it fast enough after the speech.

Samsung used clips from Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey to argue that Apple’s design patent for the shape of a tablet was invalidating prior art.

Apple really seems to be taking the brunt of video prior art challenges.

Just one week ago, a Federal district judge in the Northern District of Florida addressed–apparently for the first time–whether a YouTube video could constitute prior art. The court, in HVLPO2, LLC v. Oxygen Frog, LLC, 4:16-CV-336 (MW/CAS) (Dkt. No. 133), held that a YouTube video can constitute prior art and that YouTube videos are “sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art.” Not exactly a groundbreaking finding to someone of my generation, who grew up with YouTube and the internet. Indeed, the USPTO’s own training guides (slide 15) specifically state that YouTube videos are a perfectly acceptable form of prior art. The USPTO has stated that videos qualified prior to the AIA, but there is conflicting authority.

The plaintiff in HVLPO2 had argued that the particular YouTube video in question was uploaded on a random account, so no one interested in the art would have found it. The court pushed back in eccentric fashion, stating:

It appears that Plaintiff is unfamiliar with how YouTube works. A familiar user would know that you don’t need to search for a particular channel to watch the videos uploaded on it. For example, if you want to watch a video of a cat skateboarding, you can search “cat skateboarding”; you don’t need to know that it might have been “CatLady83” who uploaded the video you end up watching.

The court held that the YouTube video in question appeared within the first 20 videos when using appropriate search terms on the site. “Surely, the effort involved in composing a basic search query and scrolling down the page a few times does not exceed the ‘reasonable diligence’ that the law expects of a hypothetical prior art subject.” I couldn’t agree more, and I recommend this fun cat skateboarding video:

But even though most YouTube videos are generally accessible, not all are available to the public. For example, YouTube videos may be “private” or “unlisted,” potentially removing them from the “otherwise available to the public” category or at least undermining the argument for their accessibility. Thus, as even the court in HVLPO2 noted, the defendant still has to prove the existence of public access to the video prior to the applicable date. This can be accomplished by proffering screenshots of the video in the browser and evidence of that video’s publication date (which is disclosed on the YouTube website and many other video sharing platforms).

Besides the above, there are few other examples of videos (online or otherwise) being used as prior art. This is probably due in part to the current difficulty of searching the vast amount of video and audio–as opposed to text, for example–available on the internet. But as computer learning gets better and better, I expect audiovisual prior art will play a bigger role in both patent prosecution and litigation, so long as that prior art is “otherwise available to the public.”

Copyright Law on Embedded Images Gets Blurrier – Goldman v. Breitbart

Posted in Copyrights

A few months ago, a federal district court in New York held that several publishers violated a photographer’s copyright when they embedded a photograph from one of the photographer’s Twitter posts. Goldman v. Breitbart News Network, No. 17-CV-3144 (KBF) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2018). The photographer, Justin Goldman, had sued Breitbart News Network, TIME Inc., The Boston Globe and other online publishers last year for copyright infringement, alleging they displayed in various online news stories, without permission, a photograph he took of New England Patriots quarterback Tom Brady, which he had posted on Twitter.

In their defense, the publishers invoked the “Server Test,” based on the prominent Ninth Circuit decision, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007), which held that the unauthorized display of Google Image search engine results, of photographs stored on third-party servers, did not constitute copyright infringement, provided that such images were not hosted on Google’s servers. Essentially, the Server Test provides that website publishers are not liable for copyright infringement if they embed content hosted on third-party servers, but not their own servers.

But in the Goldman case, the New York court (under the jurisdiction of the Second Circuit), questioned the validity of the Ninth Circuit rule, because the court concluded that the Copyright Act does not require physical possession of the copyrighted material. The court relied on Supreme Court precedent supporting that merely transmitting copyrighted material can constitute infringement, regardless of “invisible” technical distinctions regarding the means of the infringing display or distribution, see American Broadcasting Co.s, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). Therefore, the court declined to apply the Server Test, and concluded that the publisher defendants “violated plaintiff’s exclusive display right [and] the fact that the image was hosted on a server owned and operated by an unrelated third party (Twitter) does not shield them from this result.”

Furthermore, the court emphasized a “critical” distinction with Perfect 10 regarding the “paramount” role of the user. The web users in Perfect 10 were required to click on the thumbnail images in the Google Image search, in order to see the full-size images hosted on third-party servers. By contrast, in the Goldman case, visitors to the defendants’ websites would immediately see the full-size image, without any volitional act of clicking to connect to a third-party server.

On March 19, the district court granted the publisher defendants’ motion to certify the decision for interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit, acknowledging the parties’ representations that the decision created “uncertainty for online publishers” with a significant “impact beyond this case” due to the popularity of Twitter and “retweeting.” Some commentators, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation, suggest that the Goldman decision threatens in-line linking and, if followed by other courts, could require monumental changes to online news publishing. One amicus brief in the New York case also predicted that the Goldman ruling will “transform the internet as we know it.” While some of these gloomy predictions may be overstated based on a single district court decision, the appeal to the Second Circuit will certainly be closely watched, so stay tuned for updates.

 

A Minnowsotan Perspective on TM Disclaimers

Posted in Advertising, Articles, Branding, Marketing, Trademarks, USPTO

There is at least one more 2018 Rapala billboard out there, just netted this one over the weekend:

Rapala’s clever Minnowsotan billboard inspired me to cast a few lines about the law concerning trademark disclaimers, as they often reel in some great questions from branding professionals.

Tim did a helpful post on trademark disclaimers, guiding why the USPTO requires them, their legal implications, and encouraging brand owners to properly resist them when they are unwarranted.

Let’s suppose Rapala sought to register Minnowsotan as a trademark for fishing lures. Putting aside wondering whether this little fish might ever attack, Rapala should lose no sleep wondering whether it would be required to disclaim “minnow” from the would-be Minnowsota trademark. No.

While it is true that “minnow” is an element of Minnowsotan, and there should be little debate that “minnow” is either descriptive or generic for a fishing lure depicting a minnow, a disclaimer is not required under the law by the USPTO when the applied-for mark is unitary (TMEP 1213.05):

“The test for unitariness inquires whether the elements of a mark are so integrated or merged together that they cannot be regarded as separable.”

“A unitary mark has certain observable characteristics. Specifically, its elements are inseparable. In a unitary mark, these observable characteristics must combine to show that the mark has a distinct meaning of its own independent of the meaning of its constituent elements. In other words, a unitary mark must create a single and distinct commercial impression.”

Using Minnowsotan as a trademark school hypothetical, it would be a pretty clear example of unitariness — with no need for a disclaimer, but what about Minnow Spoon for fishing lures?

In other words, is Minnow Spoon unitary for a fishing lure that depicts a minnow on a spoon lure?

Perhaps a cloudier answer than for Minnowsota, but usually two-word marks without compression, telescoping, or hyphenation, will require disclaimers of any descriptive or generic wording.

As it turns out, Minnow Spoon once adorned the Supplemental Register, as a merely descriptive composite mark, only capable of being distinctive, with no disclaimer of the generic “spoon” word.

Reading between the lily pad leaves, it appears the USPTO twice has considered Rapala’s Minnow Spoon to be unitary, as it allowed Rapala to federally-register the two-word mark on the Principal Register too, without a disclaimer of the obviously generic second term “spoon” for fishing lures.

Yet, that consistent disclaimer treatment appears inconsistent with the USPTO’s previous disclaimer requirement for “spoon” with the four-word Rapala Weedless Minnow Spoon mark.

Without getting too tangled up in the weeds at the USPTO, while generic matter must be disclaimed from marks registered on the Supplemental Register and the Principal Register (even under a showing of acquired distinctiveness, as was the case with Minnow Spoon), a disclaimer should not be required by the USPTO, if the composite mark is unitary.

Given that guidance, what would you expect with the “Original Finnish Minnow” mark? Well, that one was treated as not unitary, it appears, since a disclaimer of “minnow” was required. And, the same is true for Minnow Chaser and Clackin’ Minnow, as each one had “minnow” disclaimed.

The crazy thing about the “minnow” disclaimer for Clackin’ Minnow is that it was a Supplemental Registration, so the disclaimer should mean that “minnow” actually is generic for fishing lures.

A school of minnows in trademark class might be left thinking that both of the terms “minnow” and “spoon” are generic for lures, highlighting the importance of resisting them when appropriate.

Scandalous Trademark Applications On Hold

Posted in Articles, Branding, First Amendment, Marketing, Trademarks, USPTO

Trademarks consisting of or comprising “scandalous or immoral” matter still won’t be granted federal registration “in the name of the United States of America,” at least for the time being.

Immediately on the heels of the International Trademark Association’s 140th Annual Meeting in Seattle, and our well-received panel discussion concerning Trademarks and Free Speech, the United States Patent and Trademark Office announced it will continue to hold on to and suspend trademark applications containing scandalous or immoral matter, until further notice.

The Trademark Office is waiting to see whether the federal government will appeal the Brunetti decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. What I would give to be a fly on the wall in those discussions.

As you may recall, a three-member panel of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), ruled last December that the “scandalous or immoral” statutory bar to registration violates a trademark applicant’s Free Speech, overturning a part of trademark law in existence since 1905.

Since the federal government’s request that the entire CAFC reconsider the three-member panel decision Brunetti was denied in April, the government now has until July 11 to seek Supreme Court review or ask for more time to decide, stay tuned. Learned John Welch predicts no appeal.

During our INTA panel discussion, I predicted the government will seek review of Brunetti by the U.S. Supreme Court. I also predicted the Supreme Court will pass on the request, stay tuned.

Even if it might be tempting to believe that — in our present culture — anything goes and nothing can rise to the level of scandalousness any longer, so why bother trying to salvage a statutory relic from more than 100 years ago, I’m thinking the federal government won’t throw in the towel yet.

As we’ve written before, the Brunetti decision, didn’t anchor itself to the viewpoint discriminatory requirement from the Supreme Court in Tam, instead focusing on mere content discrimination to justify invalidation of a more than a century old part of federal trademark law.

This much easier test for invalidation puts at risk many other portions of federal trademark law, so I’m thinking the federal government can’t let the mere content discriminatory requirement of Brunetti stand without at least trying for Supreme Court review for further direction and guidance.

It’s also hard to believe the federal government is truly ready to have the USPTO knowingly begin to federally register obscene, profane, and sexually explicit matter as trademarks, “in the name of the United States of America,” for the first time in history. What’s your prediction?

Good Translation/Bad Translation

Posted in Advertising, Almost Advice, Branding, Guest Bloggers, Mixed Bag of Nuts, Product Packaging, Squirrelly Thoughts

-Mark Prus, Principal, NameFlash Name Development

When you finally identify a name for your business, product or service, you must conduct proper due diligence to ensure that you have a legal right to use the name. Trademark searches are mandatory and I’d strongly recommend talking to a great trademark attorney. A little upfront time and money can save you a ton of heartache and cash at a later point (if, for example, the name you decide to use is challenged by someone who is already using a similar name).

One of the other things you should do is conduct foreign language checks using native speakers to identify if the name has unfavorable meaning in a foreign language. Even if you do not plan to market in a foreign country, you do not want your name associated with unfavorable meanings. Here are some examples that prove the point:

  • Barf Detergent – In Persian apparently Barf means snow. But can you imagine the conflict in the mind of an English speaker when seeing a detergent called Barf?

  • Vicks – When Vicks was introduced in Germany, somebody forgot that the German pronunciation of “v” is “f” which made their “Vicks” brand name sound like slang for sexual intercourse (the name in German speaking countries is now Wick which translates correctly).
  • Scat Airlines – An airline based in Kazakhstan. Not sure if an English speaker would fly them.

  • Emerdata – This is the reincarnation of Cambridge Analytica. I find great irony in the fact that the name translations in Portuguese and Italian refer to the act of defecation.
  • IKEA – IKEA has a unique naming convention that often leads to translation errors. For example, some product names sounded like sex acts. And in many cases, IKEA names just sound amusing to English speakers:

Perhaps there is an alternative strategy to conducting a disaster check on international translation. What if you actively looked for names that translate well across the major languages of the world? As an example, one of the reasons that Kit Kat is so successful in Japan is the name “Kit Kat” famously translates to “You will surely win.”

“Good Translation” might be an excellent naming strategy!

Buc-ee’s Beaver Chomps Reptilian Competitor

Posted in Articles, Branding, Dilution, Fair Use, Famous Marks, Infringement, Law Suits, Mixed Bag of Nuts, Sight, Trademarks

About a week ago, we reported on an interesting case out of the Southern District of Texas involving two competing convenience stores with cartoon animal mascots: Buc-ee’s (a beaver) and Choke Canyon (an alligator).

As someone who has personally visited Buc-ee’s stores, I can tell you that they are quite the destination. Buc-ee’s tend to be absolutely massive, with checkout lanes (everything’s bigger in Texas). People even buy T-shirts with Buc-ee’s logos on the front, with various Texan sayings on the back. I personally own three of them. So it’s kind of an understatement to call Buc-ee’s a “convenience store,” by Minnesota standards. And one can hardly complete a description of Buc-ee’s without noting that it is considered to have the “best bathrooms in Texas.”

Credit: Houston Chronicle

Choke Canyon? Yeah, its locations are pretty big too, but the mascot is far less cuddly. Though, it has a nice saying above the exit that probably wouldn’t work at Buc-ee’s: “See ya later, alligator.”

Credit: Yelp

Buc-ee’s sued Choke Canyon for a variety of claims, including: trademark infringement, dilution, unfair competition, and unjust enrichment. We cover these topics frequently on DuetsBlog (check out the topics column).

I must admit that when I first read about the suit, I could hardly believe it. I agree with my colleague that “the best I see from this case is that Choke Canyon may make consumers think of Buc-ee’s stores and beaver, but consumers don’t seem likely to assume that that there is a connection between the two.” And I also think that ” if it weren’t May, I’d assume this was an April Fools Day joke.”

But it’s no joke, and after a four-day jury trial and six hours of deliberation, Buc-ee’s won on all fronts. Specifically, the jury answered six questions (downloadable here):

  1. On Buc-ee’s claims for trademark infringement of its Buc-ee’s Logo, do you find for Buc-ee’s or Choke Canyon?
    • Jury answer: Buc-ee’s
    • Interestingly, the jury sent one note to the District Judge during deliberations, asking “Does the logo to be considered by the jury in rendering an infringement judgment include a version without words?” To which the Judge responded, “Yes.”
  2. Do you find that Buc-ee’s Logo was famous throughout Texas before Choke Canyon’s use of the Choke Canyon Logo?
    • Jury answer: Yes
  3. Because the jury answered “yes” to question 2, they skipped question 3 (which pertained to specific geographic areas in Texas).
  4. On Buc-ee’s claim for dilution by blurring of its Buc-ee’s Logo, do you find for Buc-ee’s or Choke Canyon?
    • Jury answer: Buc-ee’s
  5. On Buc-ee’s claim for unfair competition, do you find for Buc-ee’s or Choke Canyon?
    • Jury answer: Buc-ee’s
  6. On Buc-ee’s claim for unjust enrichment, do you find for Buc-ee’s or Choke Canyon?
    • Jury Answer: Buc-ee’s

I am surprised by the generality of the questions presented to the jury, and it’s interesting that the jury was not asked about damages–perhaps the issue was bifurcated and will be tried to a different jury.

Question 1, and the jury note, suggests to me that the jury was allowed to focus purely on the similarities between the cartoon animals in the above logos, disregarding Choke Canyon logo’s ribbon stating “Choke Canyon Travel Centers.” But even then, the only obvious similarities are the orientation of the mascots, the yellow background, the wearing of a hat, and their smiles and red tongues. It is hard to believe those basic, nominal characteristics are enough to show consumer confusion and infringement. Maybe Choke Canyon has a good chance on appeal or at judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

And I cannot help but wonder, in view of Question 2, whether the fact that Buc-ee’s mark was famous throughout Texas prior to Choke Canyon’s use of its alligator mark played the most important role in the jury’s verdict. Perhaps the jury felt that Choke Canyon intended to ride on Buc-ee’s mark. Indeed, at closing argument, Buc-ee’s counsel reminded the jurors that a survey showed more than 80% of Texans recognize the Buc-ee’s logo. But I tend to agree with Choke Canyon’s closing argument that the lawsuit seems directed at stifling competition, rather than truly protecting consumers–pointing to Buc-ee’s own prior statement that it only noticed the potential for consumer confusion when Choke Canyon began buying property in towns where Buc-ee’s operates. I find it hard to believe that a reasonable consumer would seriously confuse the two mascots and think they were associated. But apparently two actual-consumer witnesses testified in Buc-ee’s favor on this point. Texas sure is a strange place sometimes.

“Square Donuts” – Generic for Cafe Services?

Posted in Branding, Infringement, Law Suits, Loss of Rights, Mixed Bag of Nuts, Trademarks, USPTO

Two businesses in Indiana are squaring off in a trademark lawsuit over the right to use the term Square Donuts for…well, square-shaped donuts.

Back in 2005, Square Donuts, a cafe with four locations in Indiana, sent a letter to Family Express (a convenience store chain with 70 locations in Indiana), demanding that Family Express cease the use of the term “Square Donuts” for the square-shaped donuts sold in its stores.

The parties wrangled for years about a potential co-existence agreement, in which Square Donuts would allow Family Express to use the “square donuts” term, but they never reached an agreement.

Later, Square Donuts filed a federal trademark application for the word mark SQUARE DONUTS for “cafe services,” claiming use since 1968, and obtained registration in 2013. (Reg. No. 4341135). The USPTO initially refused registration based on mere descriptiveness, but the refusal was overcome when Square Donuts claimed acquired distinctiveness (secondary meaning based on long and substantially exclusive use).

A couple years ago, Family Express filed a preemptive, declaratory-judgment complaint in Indiana federal court, on several grounds–including that the term “square donuts” is generic, and therefore, Square Donuts’s trademark registration No. 4341135 should be cancelled, and Family Express has the right to use that generic term. Additionally, Family Express filed last year a petition for cancellation before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), also claiming this registration should be cancelled based on genericness. (The TTAB proceeding is currently suspended based on the federal court action.)

The genericness claim is interesting for a couple reasons. First, in both its federal court complaint, and the TTAB petition, Family Express claims the SQUARE DONUTS registration should be cancelled because the term “square donuts” has become “generic…for square-shaped donuts.” But as discussed in previous posts, the genericness inquiry must be tied to the particular goods or services for which the trademark rights are claimed and registered. Magic Wand Inc. v. RDB Inc., 19 USPQ2d 1551, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Square Donuts registered and claims rights to the mark SQUARE DONUTS for its “cafe services,” particularly as the name of its cafe.

Indeed, in the Board’s order suspending the TTAB proceeding, the Board left a footnote that was critical of Family Express’s genericness claim, and suggested it must be re-pleaded in an amended petition, if the suspension is lifted, because the genericness inquiry must be “based on the recited services in the registration at issue,” namely cafe services, not “square-shaped donuts.” However, as also correctly noted by the Board, a term can be generic for a genus of services, such as cafe services, if the relevant public understands the term to refer to a key or featured good that characterizes that genus of services (e.g., serving square-shaped donuts).  In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 118 USPQ2d 1632, 1637 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

Therefore, the appropriate genericness inquiry here — which will be more difficult for Family Express to establish — is whether the term “square donuts” has become generic for the genus of “cafe services.” In other words, do the relevant consumers refer generally to the genus of cafes (even cafes that feature square donuts), as “square donuts”?

Second, another interesting point is that Family Express still appears to be claiming trademark rights to “Square Donuts” as a brand for their donuts, while arguing the term is generic at the same time. The Family Express website, “Our Brands,” prominently features a section discussing their “Square Donuts” brand, with an introductory paragraph about “our proprietary brands.” This cuts against their argument that the term is generic, meaning it’s not a “brand,” and no party can claim exclusive, “proprietary” rights. I wonder if that website will show up as an exhibit at some point.

What do you think? Will Family Express be able to establish genericness here? Stay tuned for further updates on this dispute.